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Abstract  
This study evaluates the welfare implications of tariff reforms in the cereals sector of the SADC region. 
Applying the global simulation model (GSIM), a multi-country partial equilibrium model, to the cereals 
industries of thirteen SADC countries, the study computes price and welfare effects of tariff reforms on 
different economic groups in each country, and evaluates responsiveness to external supply shocks. Results 
indicate that on net, elimination of intra-regional tariffs is welfare reducing for the region - a robust result as 
indicated by the sensitivity tests. South Africa emerges as the sole beneficiary of intra-regional tariff 
elimination, with positive net welfare gains attained through higher producer surplus; whereas the rest of SACU 
experiences losses in consumer surplus, and the rest of SADC experiences losses in producer surplus. Imports 
from the rest of the world drop for most net-importer SADC countries, whereas trade with the SADC region 
generally increases, indicating that both trade diversion and trade creation result from these tariff reforms. The 
negative net welfare effects suggest that the trade diversion effects exceed the trade creation effects for most of 
SADC. Larger, positive welfare effects are expected for all of SADC, except South Africa and Zimbabwe, when 
countries implement indiscriminate reform of MFN tariff rates, although gains come at major costs to regional 
producers. Imports from both the region and the world are also expected to increase. Tariff reforms also seem to 
serve the purpose of spreading price and quantity risk, albeit meagerly, from supply shocks generated within the 
region, making it less intense in countries of origin, and more intense for the rest of SADC. 
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1.  Introduction  
1.1  Research Problem  
Policy makers in the southern Africa region have the big challenge of reconciling domestic and trade policies, in 
order to maintain stability in food supply and prices. Improving intra-regional trade, through reduction of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to regional trade has been widely advocated as a critical piece in the food insecurity 
puzzle. According to the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) arm of the SADC Secretariat, 
regional supplies (production plus opening stocks) in any given season are enough to cover regional 
consumption needs, so that facilitating freer movement of grains would aid in meeting isolated shortfalls 
(SADC 2003). Moepeng 2003, also argues that ‘free trade in the region would facilitate large-scale production 
of white maize in SADC countries with comparative advantage, and improve regional food security, even in 
drought period, because regional stocks can be made available to food importing countries such as Botswana.’ 
Simplification and harmonization of trade regulations has been promoted as a response mechanism to drought 
emergencies in the region, (Tschirley et al 2004, Mano 2003), while integrating the region with the global 
markets is recognized as a critical component of a comprehensive food strategy (World Bank DTIS 
Mozambique, 2004 and Malawi, 2002). Regional trade is also thought to be key to efforts to intensify 
production in surplus producing countries (Arlindo and Tschirley, 2003). In addition, the vast amounts of 
research in understanding trade policy (SADC FANR, 1996-2005), and monitoring cross-border grain 
movements (FEWS/WFP, 2004-2005), seems to indicate significant trade flows and price responses to market 
forces.  
 
Despite these general pro-trade sentiments, and the numerous attempts to understand the food sector of the 
SADC region, the lack of a clear understanding of the welfare effects of specific trade policy options on specific 
economic groups, necessary to reduce ambiguity in policy recommendations and to accurately anticipate 
potential negative effects, has forced countries to remain significantly closed with regards to trade in food 
commodities (Mano et al, 2003). The tendency to control food markets in poor countries, however, is not 
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completely unwarranted, considering that large segments of the populations live at the verge of inadequate 
nutrition (about a third of the SADC population, World Development Indicators, 2005) and are therefore 
susceptible to minor shifts in supply or prices. Openness has been thought to exacerbate susceptibility to 
external shocks – such as the risk of excessive exports in regional shortage periods – that may in turn lead to 
price instability and threaten food security (Arlindo and Tschirley, 2003). Moreover, the implications of 
regional market openness are generally complex, and could have critical effects on food security. Efforts to 
quantify micro and macro level expected gains from freer trade in grains in southern Africa have been limited, 
and specific effects of trade reforms remain largely unknown. Previous literature in this area has tended to focus 
on evaluating welfare effects at a broad macro level, rather than specific industry level (Chauvin and Gaulier 
2002, Poonyth et al 2002, Madola et al 2002, Kahuika 2002, Jere 2002, Mafusire 2002, Mukherje and Robinson 
1996). According to Mano et al 2003:  
‘There is an urgent need for SADC countries to understand the complex implications of regional free 
trade agreements on agricultural policies and on their national and sub-national food economies. 
Countries must embrace the concept that achieving food self-sufficiency will not necessarily enhance 
their food security status if this is achieved at high economic costs……Regional free trade agreements, 
as facilitated through SACU, the COMESA Treaty and the SADC Protocol on Trade, can help SADC 
countries achieve national food security through regional trade integration.’ Mano, Isaacson and Dardel, 
2003. 
 
This study contributes towards bringing quantitative evidence into the trade – food policy debate.  
 
1.2  Objectives and Hypotheses  
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the welfare implications of freer trade policies in the cereals sector of the 
southern Africa region, with specific focus on the effects of tariff reforms on prices, incomes, production levels 
and consumption levels. The specific objectives are to (1) compute the expected price responses to tariff 
reforms in the cereals sector, (2) assess the potential welfare implications for consumers and producers in each 
country in the region, and (3) establish the potential effect on vulnerability (price responsiveness) to external 
supply shocks.  
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Regional integration is expected to lead to at least two types of responses in trade flows between countries 
participating in the regional free trade agreement (FTA) and the rest of the world. First, regional integration can 
lead to trade creation: when the removal of tariffs allows a member country of the FTA to increase its imports 
from its trading partner, also a member of the FTA, without reducing its imports from the rest of the world 
(ROW). Trade creation leads to increased overall trade volumes, thus is strictly beneficial for the countries 
within the FTA, and at least as beneficial for the rest of the world. The effects of trade creation on a small-
country importer from the formation of an RIA are presented in Figure 1.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Trade diversion could also result: when some of the imports from the rest of the world are replaced by imports 
from a member of the FTA, provided the final cost of imports from the FTA member (after tariffs have been 
removed) is lower than the cost of importing from the rest of the world (including tariffs). Trade diversion thus 
results in a country shifting imports to buying from a more expensive source, that is, imports are now sourced 
from a less efficient producer. Therefore trade diversion constitutes a direct transfer of wealth from ROW 
      FIGURE 1: TRADE CREATION                                   
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Let A be the regional importer, B the regional exporter and ROW exporters from the rest of the world. Suppose prior to the 
FTA, country A imports solely from the regional exporter B (note that with tariffs in place, the cost of importing from the ROW 
is exactly the same as the cost of importing from B). After the FTA is formed, country A can now import more from B, at a 
price of Prc  <  Pw + t.  
 
Country A gains b+c, but loses b+d in tariff revenues, whereas country B gains d+e, so that on net, the region gains c+e. No 
welfare losses/gains accrue to the rest of the world.  
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producers to producers from the new regional exporter, as well as an indirect transfer from consumers in the 
importing country to producers in the regional exporting country – since consumers pay more than they would 
otherwise pay if the tariffs were removed on ROW imports instead. If the marginal gain to consumers in the 
importing county is small enough (that is, if the FTA countries are small relative to the world market), the 
importing country would experience a net welfare loss almost equivalent to its foregone tariff revenues. The 
exporting country, on the other hand, captures only part of this welfare through higher export prices and the rest 
of world experiences deadweight loss from lost trade. Therefore trade diversion is generally welfare reducing 
for both the trading bloc and the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The discussion above implies that the welfare impact of FTA is ambiguous a priori, and depends to a great deal 
on the extent to which trade diversion effects exceed the trade creation effects (Hoekman and Scheiff 2002). 
This also suggests that the structure of the industry and the nature of existing trade relations among SADC 
      FIGURE 2: TRADE DIVERSION                                  
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Let A be the regional importer, B the regional exporter and ROW exporters from the rest of the world. Suppose prior to the 
FTA, country A imports Qt from the regional exporter B, and Qt’ – Qt from the ROW.  After the FTA is formed, country A can 
now source all its imports more from B, at a price of Prc  =  Pw + t (note that with tariffs still in place for the ROW, the cost of 
importing from the ROW is now the same as the cost of importing from B).  
 
No gains accrue to Country A, since the pre-FTA price is equal to the post-FTA price, but A loses b+c+d in tariff revenues. 
Country B gains only d+c of this welfare, and on net, the region loses d. Although the ROW loses the export of Qt’ – Qt to 
country B, no significant welfare loss is experienced in the ROW since both A and B are too small to influence ROW welfare. 
Overall, the FTA is welfare reducing. 
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countries would influence the welfare effects of implementing region-wide tariff reforms. For example, welfare 
effects on net-exporters to the SADC region (i.e. countries that sell more cereals to the SADC region than they 
buy from it) are expected to differ from expected effects on net importers. For net exporters, we expect positive 
producer surplus responses and negative consumer surplus responses. Based on classic trade theory, we also 
expect the increase in producer surplus from a given price change to always exceed the consumer surplus 
response to an equivalent price change, so that on net, the exporter is better-off. This is because when the price 
in an exporting country increases, producers capture all the welfare lost by consumers in that country, as well as 
some of the welfare lost by producers in the importing country – true in both the trade creation and trade 
diversion cases. For net importers, consumers are expected to benefit, and the consumer surplus responses from 
a given price change to be exceed producer surplus responses, for similar reasons. The net welfare effects, 
however, would depend on the extent to which the net private gains exceed the loss in tariff revenues. This 
analysis is however complicated by the fact that although most of SADC, with the exception of South Africa, 
are net importers of cereals in general, at regional level, a few additional countries: Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe are net exporters to the region. For these countries, welfare responses to price changes are difficult to 
predict a priori.  
 
The analysis performed in this study is compounded by the fact that some countries are already participating in 
free trade agreements with each other. The effects of tariff reforms for those countries already participating in 
one or more regional free trade agreements may differ substantially from those outlined above, as implementing 
region-wide tariff reforms in these countries may lead to preference erosion, hence welfare losses. These 
hypotheses are evaluated in the analyses performed in section 4 below. Furthermore, for specific tariff lines in 
some countries of the region, specifically the SACU region, protection comes in the form of tariff rates quotas 
(TRQs). For such commodities, tariff elimination implies that both in- and out-of-quota imports face zero 
tariffs, thus nullifies the effects of the quota. Noting also that SACU imports very small proportions from the 
SADC region (so that SADC imports almost certainly fall within the quota), and that only a small proportion of 
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SACU tariff lines are subject to TRQs, these are not likely to influence significantly the expected responses 
discussed above. These assumptions are adopted in the analysis as detailed in section 3.2.  
 
1.3  Trade Policy in the Cereals Sector of SADC  
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an economic integration block comprising of 14 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA): Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Through mostly unilateral policy reforms, countries of the SADC region have undergone market 
liberalization and trade policy changes in the past two decades, aimed at promoting market-led growth and freer 
trade among members. Although SADC is not a regional trading block per se, promoting intra-regional trade 
has become one of its core objectives, as evidenced by the ratification of the Trade Protocol in 2000, under 
which countries agreed to gradually phase-out tariffs in most industrial sectors by 2012. In addition, half of 
SADC countries are also members of autonomous free trading agreements in existence in SSA: the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), under 
which trade is either tariff-free (SACU), or almost tariff-free (COMESA). Despite these pro-market reforms, 
intra-regional trade in southern Africa remains low, accounting for about 5% of total trade, and trade restrictions 
are maintained in most strategic sectors, such as the food grains sectors. Regional trade in grains (especially the 
region’s staple – maize) is subject to tariffs averaging 12%, import and export regulatory requirements, and 
special sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) restrictions. Trade policy in this sector remains marred with 
unpredictability, often justified as being necessary to stabilize producer incomes and food prices (Mano et al 
2003, Jayne et al 2005). Extra-regional exports are observed (23% of total exports), even as severe food 
shortages persist in parts of the region (SADC Food Security Network 2003, EAC 2004). Cross-hauling is also 
observed (24% of total regional trade), and policy coordination on pertinent issues such as production and sale 
of genetically modified (GM) grains is limited. South Africa and Zimbabwe are the only countries with clear 
legislation on production and sale of GM grain, but even for these countries, regulations differ.  
 
 10
Compared to the most protected cereals sectors of the world market, the level of tariff protection in the cereals 
sector of the SADC region, however, appears relatively low. Canada, for example applies a tariff of up to 49% 
on wheat imports, in addition to quantitative restrictions, and China’s tariffs in the same sector are as high as 
68%, again with quantitative restriction, compared to a maximum of 25% in the SADC region. Tariff rates are 
as high as 100% in India. Similarly, applied tariff rates for maize are as high as 438% in Korea and 124% in 
Mexico. Protection on rice goes up to 80% in India. However, with simple average world tariff rate for the 
cereals sector is around 14%, and considering that almost 38% of the world economies do not apply any tariffs 
on most of their cereal commodities, an average tariff rate of 12% for the SADC region is quite significant in 
the world market (UNCTAD TRAINS data 2004). 
  
On a sub-regional level, distinct features of trade policy can be identified. Member of SACU: Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and South Africa, have relatively low tariffs (the same across all SACU 
countries) on trade with the SADC region (WITS, 2005). SACU countries currently have no safeguard or 
antidumping measures on cereals trade, nor do they require licenses for trade (WTO 1994 – 2006). However, 
special sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures apply, and some commodities are subject to tariff quota 
restrictions. In South Africa, for example, tariff quota restrictions of 108 279 tons for wheat, 83 tons for rye, 
110800 tons for barley, 7333 tons for oats, 269000tons for maize, and 21116 tons sorghum apply. The quotas 
are normally filled for all commodities, and are therefore restrictive. Out of quota tariff protection varies among 
sectors, for maize, for example, the tariff is based on a tariff band formula which delivers a tariff only when 
world prices fall below US $110/ton free-on-board US Gulf ports prices. According to this formula current 
tariff rates on maize are 0% (WTO 1994 – 2006). South Africa also is the only SADC country currently 
producing genetically modified grains for commercial sale (Mano 2003).  
 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe – the SADC countries that are also members of COMESA – also enjoy tariff-
free trade with each other for most cereal commodities, though having autonomous policies on trade with the 
rest of the world. These countries also have a similar state-interventionist history in their cereals production and 
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trade policy, however with market oriented reforms implemented in the past few years, countries have adopted 
more liberal cereals trade policy. In Malawi tariffs on maize grain have been eliminated, though import licenses 
are required to engage in trade, and tariffs of up to 25% are maintained for products such as wheat flour. 
Although Malawi provides no export subsidies or safeguard measure, it still provides some form of domestic 
support to producers, and cereal imports are subject to some SPS restrictions. For example, while Malawi will 
accept GM grain as food aid, it prohibits planting or growing GM grains (Mano 2003). Zambia has no import 
license requirements for trade in cereals, though imports are subject to tariffs of up to 25% for most processed 
products, and numerous antidumping, rules of origin and SPS measures (WTO 1994 – 2006). The Zambian 
government, for example, maintains and has used the right, to ban exports during poor harvest seasons (Mano, 
2003). Zambia also has a strict policy against importation of genetically modified grains, even in the form of 
food aid.  For Zimbabwe, cereal imports are subject to relatively high tariff rates (up to 30%), and several SPS 
measures (WTO 1994 – 2006). Import levies are generally applied on private imports, such as the US$3.50 per 
50kg bag levied on imports of maize grain, maize meal or rice in excess of one bag (FEWS NET 2005). Only 
the state trading enterprise – the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) – has legal authority to engage in, or provide 
license for, trade of grains. Although no export subsidies are offered, domestic support is given to producers in 
the form of subsidies inputs. Most importantly, trade policy is characterized by extreme variability and ad-hoc 
policy changes, mostly aimed at further restricting cross-border grain movement (Mano 2003). Like Zambia, 
Zimbabwe also has strict policy against importation of GM grains, although Zimbabwe has established 
legislature governing production of GM crops in the country, and is currently involved in GM research (WTO 
1994 – 2006). 
 
Mozambique’s cereals sector, one of the least protected in the region, has tariff rates ranging between 2.5 and 
7.5%, higher only for wheat and maize flour at 25% (WITS 2005, Arlindo and Tschirley 2003). Nonetheless, 
trade is governed by trading licenses, extensive inspections, and non-trivial taxes (World Bank DTIS, 
Mozambique 2004). In Tanzania, exports are generally restricted, trade can only be conducted through state-
issued licenses, and an almost flat tariff rate of 25% is applied to imports of cereals and cereal products (WITS 
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2005, Mano et al 2003). Poor infrastructure has created localized inefficiencies in grain distribution, and foods 
handouts are not uncommon, however little farmer support is provided (Mano, 2003). Tanzania trades more 
closely with Uganda and Kenya under the East African Cooperation (EAC) – an economic integration bloc 
constituting these three countries. Grains, particularly maize, attract low tariffs among EAC countries, however, 
trade is impeded by numerous non-tariff barriers such as an unpredictable policy environment, extensive pre-
shipment inspections and inconsistent SPS measures (EAC 2004).  Although tariff rates are generally lower 
among EAC countries, the economic bloc is not a free trade area. 
 
Angola and DRC are among the major deficit markets for cereals in the region, collectively absorbing 8% of 
SADC’s exports, and a lot more from the world market through commercial imports and food aid (FAOSTAT, 
2004).  Angola applies a flat tariff rate of 2% on all grains and DRC a 5 to 10% tariff rate. Tariffs on processed 
cereal products are relatively higher, averaging 10% in both countries (WITS 2005). Like most SADC 
countries, while resistant to GM foods, these countries do not have any regulations in place to govern 
production and sale of GM grains (reference). Mauritius applies tariffs ranging from 0 to 20% on different tariff 
lines of the cereals sector.   
 
A summary of selected descriptive statistics on the structure of the cereals sector of the SADC region between 
1999 and 2002 – the study period – is presented in Table 1. Note that the 2002 tariff rates may differ from 
current rates, where countries have engaged in further reforms. SADC’s newest addition – Madagascar – is 
excluded from the analysis, in accordance with the data used in the analysis discussed in Section 3.2.  
 
Proximity seems to play a significant role in the location of each country’s major trading partners, especially 
with regards to destination of exports, emphasizing the non-trivial effects of transport costs on trade flows. 
South Africa is the main source of imports from the region for all SADC countries, and countries consume most 
of their production as evidenced by the very high domestic absorption rates. Statistics indicate that none of the 
SADC countries are self-sufficient in producing all the cereals they require. This is possibly because although 
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some countries may be self-sufficient in some of the cereals, possibly their staple (maize), most of them are not 
self-sufficient in the production of those cereals such as rice and wheat. For example, although South Africa has 
managed to produce more than its domestic requirements in maize, it produces only 45% of its wheat 
requirements, and imports most of its rice (FAOSTAT, 2005). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics – SADC Cereals sector, 1999-2002 
 Average 
MFN 
tariff on 
imports1 
(%)  
Average 
tariff on 
imports 
from 
SADC 
(%) 
Average 
tariff on 
exports 
to ROW 
(%)  
Major 
regional 
source of 
imports  
(% of value 
of Imports)  
Major regional 
export market  
(% of value of 
Exports) 
Domestic 
Absorption  
(% of value 
of total 
output) 
Domestic 
contribution to 
local demand  
(% of value of 
consumption) 
Membership 
in Regional 
Integration  
Agreements 
other than 
SADC2  
Angola  8.5 8.5  - South Africa 
(7.0) 
Namibia  
(17.1) 
99.6 65.3  
Botswana 9.0 6.0 10  South Africa 
(64.5) 
South Africa 
(53.2) 
26.4 1.6 SACU  
DRC 8.6 8.6  - South Africa 
(17.4) 
Zambia  
(4.3) 
99.6 85.0  
Lesotho 9.0 6.0 0  South Africa 
(94.6) 
South Africa 
(99.1) 
81.4 45.6 SACU  
Malawi 16.0 6.0 25 South Africa 
(34.4) 
Zimbabwe  
(52.3) 
98.5 72.7 COMESA 
Mauritius  2.4  2.4  - South Africa 
(0.37) 
Zambia  
(1.2) 
66.4 45.6  
Mozambique 9.0 5.0 0  South Africa 
(12.5) 
Malawi  
(89.7) 
94.8 76.0  
Namibia 9.0 6.0 2 South Africa 
(55.5) 
Angola  
(93.4) 
90.3 41.2 SACU  
South Africa  9.0 6.0 18 Lesotho  
(2.4) 
Botswana  
(14.6) 
87.7 87.0 SACU 
Swaziland  9.0 6.0 0  South Africa 
(97.4) 
South Africa 
(73.8) 
82.6 31.0 SACU  
Tanzania 25.0 25.0 1 South Africa 
(2.8) 
Malawi  
(29.9) 
98.1 86.0  EAC 
Zambia  12.0 8.0 30 South Africa 
(56.8) 
Zimbabwe  
(11.8) 
98.3 86.2 COMESA 
Zimbabwe  20.0 16 3 South Africa 
(58.5) 
Botswana  
(48.2) 
94.4 91.2 COMESA 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Most Favored Nation (MFN) global unit value weighted average tariff rates.  
2 Only membership to regional integration bodies entailing zero tariffs on grain trade are listed here. Note that most SADC countries are members to 
more regional and international preferential trading arrangements such as the Cotonou Agreement with the European Union.  
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2.  Research Methods and Applications  
2.1  Partial Equilibrium Methods 
The methods for trade policy welfare analyses could be divided into two broad categories: partial and general 
equilibrium approaches. Partial equilibrium analyses date back to Marshall in the early 20th century, and assess 
the market for a single good for which the wealth effect is small (MasColell 1995). The partial equilibrium is 
thus viewed as a sector-specific condition, in which impacts on endogenous variables not related to the sector 
under study are explicitly or implicitly disregarded. The assumption is that the production/consumption 
decisions in the sector of interest is unaffected by changes occurring elsewhere in the economy. Thus we can 
combine the rest of the economy into a single composite good called the numeraire, and with an additional 
assumption of quasilinear utility, demand and supply can be expressed as functions of prices only, with 
negligible wealth effects. Comparative statics analyses would then involve direct assessment of marginal 
changes in quantities and prices. In practice, the relevant tax/subsidy is incorporated into the appropriate price 
vector of the demand and supply functions and, assuming these functions are differentiable, the marginal 
change in equilibrium allocation or prices is derived simply through application of the implicit function 
theorem. Welfare is measured through evaluation of Marshallian aggregate surplus: the utility gains from 
consumption less the costs of production.  
 
Because partial equilibrium analyses posses the merit of simplicity and transparency, their application in the 
welfare literature has been extensive, ranging from applications of the basic model to its more sophisticated 
extensions such as the multi-market, multi-region global partial equilibrium models for example the USDA’s 
Statistical World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) modeling framework by Roningen et al 1991, the World Bank 
and UNCTAD Software on Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade (SMART) model (Stern et al 1975), the 
Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) by UNCTAD and FAO 2002, and Global Simulation 
(GSIM) model by Francois and Hall 2003.   
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2.2  General Equilibrium Methods  
The major limitation of partial equilibrium analyses is the risk of suppressing interactions of economic variables 
that may be linked in a significant way. General equilibrium analyses differ from the former in that they view 
the economy as an interrelated system in which the equilibrium values of all variables of interest must be 
simultaneously determined. The basic theoretic structure for general equilibrium analysis was developed by 
Walras in the late 1800’s, and improved upon by Debreu 1959, Johansen 1960, Harberger 1962, Scarf 1967, 
Arrow and Hahn 1971, among others. Some of the early applications and major contributions to the theory of 
general equilibrium welfare analyses were through the work of Heckscher, Ohlin, Leontief, Samuelson, Stolper 
and Rybczynski in the mid 1900’s.  The basic general equilibrium model is a static two-factor model, from 
which two or more commodities are produced, with the assumptions of constant returns to scale technology, and 
homothetic preferences. In a Walrasian equilibrium, factor and goods markets must simultaneously clear, and 
utility and profits maximized. Although neither existence nor uniqueness of the general equilibrium is 
guaranteed, to the extent that consumer preferences and production technologies are well-behaved, these can be 
assumed with a significant degree of certainty. Comparative statics are normally performed by way of the 
Kuhn-Tucker estimations, assuming differentiable production and utility functions, and welfare is normally 
measured using the Hicksian equivalent variation and compensation variation.   
 
The theoretic framework described above has been applied to empirical situations to test the effects of trade 
policy through applied general equilibrium models. Most applications of the general equilibrium framework are 
based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, with the assumption of national product differentiation, also known as the 
Armington assumption. Early applications of general equilibrium modeling include Dixon et al 1982’s work 
using the ORANI short run CGE model to analyze protection in the Australian economy, Dervis et al 1982 
analyzing protection policies in developing countries, and Whalley 1985 in multi-regional trade policy analysis. 
Some recent applications include the price or quantity based distance function measures of trade restrictiveness 
(Anderson and Neary 1996, Chau et al 2003); and the expenditure and utility function based approaches such as 
the Social Account Matrix (SAM) based Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (DeMelo 1988, 
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Robinson et al 1988, Deverajan and Rodrik 1991, Lewis et al 2003), as well as global CGE models such as the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) by Hertel 1997 and the US Applied General Equilibrium model by the 
International Trade Commission (USAGE-ITC)  (USITC 2004).  
 
In addition to capturing inter-sectoral linkages, general equilibrium models have several advantages over partial 
equilibrium models, especially in analyzing agricultural trade policy. First, evaluation is focused to household 
level, where the assumption of a representative household – owner of factors of production, consumer, taxpayer 
and recipient of subsides – is often made. This specification allows for the evaluation of macro policies’ impacts 
at the most disaggregated level (Hertel 1999). Second, applied models provide a setting for evaluating welfare 
effects in a second-best environment – where public intervention spans several levels of a given industry – by 
taking into account existing policy distortions in welfare evaluations, which makes them especially suitable for 
evaluating agricultural policy reforms. Third, most applied general equilibrium models are based on detailed 
accounting identities that must hold for an economy to be in equilibrium. This restriction is important for 
ensuring national or global market clearing, and preventing policy simulation outcomes in which economies 
spend more than their finites resources can support. Finally, general equilibrium models provide economy-wide 
assessments that emphasize relative, as opposed to absolute, efficiency and welfare difference – in accordance 
with the theory of comparative advantage. General equilibrium models, however, also tend to be data intensive, 
and may involve complex forms of analyses and huge resource investments. The construction of SAMs, for 
example, tends to be a lengthy process requiring in-depth access to data sources. At times, only marginal gains 
in precision are gained from these investments (Devarajan et al 1997). CGE models also are based on a number 
of restrictive assumptions, requiring a set of equilibrating conditions such as zero excess demands through 
market clearing conditions and full employment of resources.  Such assumptions may not always be appropriate 
for developing countries (de Melo 1988).   
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2.3  Model Specifications   
The main differences between theoretic and applied models are that the former is based on the premise of 
perfect competition, where the economy is initially assumed to be in an undistorted equilibrium, and 
infinitesimal tariffs are then introduced to compute new equilibrium outcomes, the so called first best welfare 
evaluation.  Such neoclassical models generally assume homogenous goods, produced and traded according to 
comparative advantages. Applied models, also know as second best evaluations, generally take into account the 
distortions that already exist in a given economy due to policy. As a result, it is not always the case that trade 
liberalization improves welfare, as trade reform could indeed lead to resource re-allocation from one distorted 
sector to an even more distorted one (Francois and Reinert, 1997). Evaluations are usually based on trade policy 
changes that are actually under consideration, not just hypothetical ones.  
 
An important aspect in model specification in applied trade policy analysis is the degree of substitutability of 
domestic commodities for imports. Perfect substitute models make the assumption that domestic goods and 
imports are homogenous, and can be substituted one for one. The elasticity of substitution is normally assumed 
constant (the case of constant elasticity of substitution, or CES utility function), and for perfect substitutes, this 
elasticity is infinity.  Most commodities however have been found to not be as homogenous across borders, and 
the assumption of imperfect substitutes, also known as the Armington assumption, has been made where goods 
of the same kind are distinguished by their country of origin.  Armington models incorporate competing 
products by evaluating horizontal linkages for similar but not identical products.  The models also generally 
assumes well behaved preferences, by assuming constant elasticity of substitution between products competing 
in any market and the same elasticity of substitution between any two products, i.e. elasticities do not depend on 
the market share and are the same between any pair of products competing in the same market.  The demand 
functions for each of mn goods – for n kinds of goods from m countries – are given by an nxm matrix X.  To 
capture the close link between goods of the same kind, the assumption of ‘independence’ is made for the utility 
function, so that the marginal rate of substitution between any two products of the same kind is independent of 
the quantity of the products of all other kinds.  Moreover, the utility functional form must be such that the 
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quantity index for each kind of commodity i, given by Xi = φi(Xi1, Xi2, …, Xim ), is linear and homogenous.  This 
implies that market shares (the share of any given product in the market) depend only on the relative prices of 
the products in the market, and not on the size of the market. Therefore there exists an unambiguous demand for 
any subset of products in the ith market. These properties result from assuming separability of demands for each 
product, and homothetic preferences, normally represented by a CES utility function. It has been shown in the 
literature that mis-specification of elasticities can lead to significant error in calculating welfare effects, 
therefore sensitivity analyses with alternative levels of elasticities are often performed. The literature also 
indicates significant differences between lower-tier versus upper-tier estimates of elasticities, long run versus 
short run estimates, cross-sectional versus time series estimates, and the level of commodity aggregation.   
 
Welfare analyses can be performed in a static or dynamic context, to capture the response at a given point in 
time in the former case, and the changes over time in the latter case. Static evaluations generally make use of 
comparative statics, using either Hicksian or Slutsky decomposition of substitution and income effects. Through 
a hypothetical change in income, one can achieve the original utility level with Hicksian decomposition, or the 
original optimum bundle of goods with Slutsky decomposition. In empirical analyses the use is Slutsky 
decomposition tends to be preferable, since only price and quantity data is required, whereas with Hicksian one 
would need to estimate the utility function. Dynamic modeling also can be achieved through the use of 
comparative statics with time subscripts, where a series of single-period equilibria are linked through static 
decisions that change household income or the capital stock of the economy through time, or through the use of 
dynamic optimization procedures.  
 
Applied general equilibrium models are commonly used to assess the economic effects of trade policy, a 
process that generally requires conversion of policy changes into price effects, to estimate how policy is 
expected to affect incomes, quantities produced / consumed, employment trade flows and macro-economic 
welfare. The common procedures of estimating numerical welfare measures of gain or losses due to policy 
changes are through evaluation of Marshallian aggregate surplus or Hicksian compensation and equivalent 
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variation.  Marshallian aggregate surplus measure the changes in producer and consumer surplus from the 
Marshallian demand function x(p,w) and the supply function q(p), where x is demand as a function of prices, p, 
and wealth, w, and q is supply as a function of price. The assumption is that the good under analysis is one of 
many, so that on the consumption side, it constitutes a small portion of the overall budget.  In addition we 
assume that the changes in the market for this good will have negligible effects on the prices of other goods. 
Alternatively, the Equivalent Variation (EV) and Compensating Variation (CV) procedures, due to Hick 1939, 
can be used to evaluate consumer welfare resulting from a policy that directly (or indirectly) affects prices or 
utility. In this case, welfare is measured in monetary terms through the estimation of money metric indirect 
utility functions. Taking p0 to represent initial prices before policy change, u0 initial indirect utility level, and 
e(p0,u0) as initial consumer expenditure, CV is defined as: CV = e(p1,u1) - e(p1,u0) and EV as:  EV = e(p0,u1) 
- e(p0,u0). Welfare improvements are observed when the CV is negative, or when EV is positive. In comparison 
to Marshallian consumer surplus, the relationship CV ≤ CS ≤ EV generally holds, with equalities for special 
utility forms such as quasilinear utility functions (MasCollel et al 1994).  Some basic partial and general 
equilibrium applied methods of trade policy analysis are briefly reviewed in Appendix 1.  
 
3. Model and Data  
3.1 The Global Simulation Model 
The liberalization of trade in cereals in the SADC region is expected to have significant effects on production 
and trade trends in the regions, given their significant contribution to both consumption and farm income. Of 
particular interest to policy makers are the potential food security effects at national and household levels. In 
this study, a regional level partial equilibrium analysis is performed, to estimate the potential effects of tariff 
reforms on domestic prices, consumer and producer surplus, and government revenue for each of the thirteen 
countries in the SADC region. The global simulation model (GSIM), due to Francois and Hall (2003), is used 
for this analysis. This static, partial equilibrium model allows for multi-country modeling, to capture welfare 
effects of policies implemented at regional and global levels. The partial equilibrium nature implies that 
analyses can be as focused as tariff-line level (the source of tariff changes), and by aggregating trade for all 
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countries in which no policy changes are expected, the analysis can be focused only on those countries of 
interest. The model is detailed, utilizing comprehensive bilateral trade and tariff data at highly disaggregated 
levels, as well as data such as exports, domestic production and domestic absorption (captured as trade with 
self). The inclusion of export statistics adds the requirement of export market clearing to the market clearing 
conditions, improving precision of results through consolidation of import and export trade flows. It also 
enables the analysis of export market access policies. The inclusion of domestic production and absorption 
allows for the prediction of self-sufficiency effects, a critical policy issue in food markets. This framework also 
offers extensive analytical capacity compared to conventional partial equilibrium tools, providing for the 
analysis of simultaneous policy changes in domestic production, taxes or subsidies; export subsidies; and tariff 
rates. Compared to global general equilibrium models, the GSIM model is more flexible, allowing for 
disaggregated sector specific analysis while capable of maintaining global scope – CGE models typically 
provide estimates at aggregate level. GSIM also offers transparency, so that welfare evaluation, measured in 
explicit income terms, can be disaggregated to producer, consumer and state level; and sources of economic 
adjustments can be clearly identified (Francois and Hall 2003).  
 
Though still fairly new, GSIM has already been applied in several welfare studies (Vanzetti 2004, Luo et al 
2004, Holzner 2004). Results from the GSIM framework can also be obtained directly from the World Bank’s 
trade database: the World Integrated Trade System (WITS), along with SMART results. To ensure close 
inspection and validation of trade, production, and absorption statistics, as well as tariff rates and elasticities, 
this study employs the basic theoretic version of the model, analyzed using Excel Solver, to find the global 
market clearing prices. The GSIM model is based upon the assumption of national product differentiation. The 
Armington assumption recognizes that commodities may not be homogenous across borders, implying that 
imports are imperfect substitutes of each other. In accordance with Armington 1969, we adopt the constant 
elasticity of substitution assumption for products competing in any market, so that elasticities are independent 
of market share and are the same between any pair of products competing in the same market. Assuming weak 
separability of demand and homothetic preferences represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
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utility function, we obtain an unambiguous demand for any subset of products in each market.  Both the 
elasticity of aggregate demand and elasticity of export supply are held constant. The import demand and export 
supply take on the log-linear form.   
 
Following Francois and Hall 2003, we can define an import demand function characterizing the import of each 
of the 12 ‘varieties’ of cereals into any given market of the region:  
(1) M(i,v),r = f(P(i,v),r , P(i,v),s≠r  , y(i,v)) 
where M(i,v),r is the quantity of good i imported from region r in country v, P(i,v),r is its price and y(i,v) total 
expenditure on good i in country v. P(i,v),s≠r are the prices in v of varieties of i from regions other than r. The 
benchmark prices are restricted to equal 1, so that in the benchmark equilibrium, the quantity and the value of 
imports is the same. Total supply of exports from region r is given as a function of Pwi,r – the world price of i 
originating from region r:  
(2) Xi,r = f(Pwi,r)  
The income and substitution effects on M(.) resulting from price changes in one or more varieties of i can be 
expressed in elasticity form as:  
(3) N(i,v),(r,s) = θ(i,v),s (Em + Es)              
(4) N(i,v)(r,r) = θ(i,v),r Em – (1 – θ(i,v),r)Es 
where N(i,v),(r,s)  is the cross price elasticity and N(i,v)(r,r) is the own price elasticity, θ(i,v),s is the expenditure share 
of imports of i from s in region v, Em is the composite demand elasticity in importing region v, and Es is the 
elasticity of substitution. Region s can be domestic, representing trade with self. The internal price of good i is a 
function of the prevailing import taxes, and the world price for i:  
(5) P(i,v),r = (1+ t(i,v),r ) Pwi,r =  T(i,v),r Pwi,r   and   P(i,v) = ∑r (θ(i,v),r . P(i,v),r ) 
where P(i,v) is the composite consumer price of i in region v, t(i,v),r is the ad valorem tariff rate applied on imports 
of good i from region r at point of entry into country v, and T(i,v),r = (1+ t(i,v),r). Using proportional changes we 
can express the percentage changes in exports, imports and internal prices as functions of world prices, 
elasticities and tariff rates:   
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(6) ∆P(i,v),r / P(i,v),r =  ∆Pwi,r / Pwi,r  +  ∆T(i,v),r / T(i,v),r   
(7) ∆Xi,r / Xi,r = EX(i,r)(∆Pwi,r / Pwi,r) 
(8) ∆M(i,v),r/M(i,v),r = N(i,v),(r,r)(∆P(i,v),r/P(i,v),r) + ∑s≠rN(i,v),(r,s)(∆P(i,v),s/P(i,v),s)   
EX is the elasticity of aggregate export supply. The market clearing conditions are then given by: 
(9)  ∆Mi,r / Mi,r = ∆Xi,r/Xi,r   ,  where Mi,r=∑vM(i,v),r  
Assuming locally linear demand and supply functions3, welfare effects are assessed by evaluating the changes 
in producer and consumer surplus: 
(10) ∆PS(i,r) = X0(i,r)∆Pwi,r + ½∆Pwi,r . ∆Xi,r 
(11) ∆CS(i,v) = ∑r(R0(i,v),r T0(i,v),r).(½Em,(i,v)(∆P(i,v)/ P(i,v))2 – (∆P(i,v)/ P(i,v))) 
where R0i,r = Pwi,r . X0i,r is the benchmark export revenue valued at world prices, T0(i,v),r is the initial tariff level 
on imports of good i from region  r into country v, and R0(i,r) T0(i,v),r initial expenditure at internal prices.  The 
changes in government revenue are given by: 
(12) ∆GR(i,v) = (∑rR1(i,v)r .T1(i,v),r – ∑rR1(i,v),r) – (∑rR0(i,v)r .T0(i,v),r –∑rR0(i,v),r)  
In the model specification assuming fixed world prices, when each r is a small country, the own and cross trade 
effects of tariff reforms are obtained directly from a decomposition of the aggregate imports function 
represented in (9) above:  
 (13) Own Trade Effect = M(i,v),r . N(i,v),(r,r) . (∆T(i,v),r / T(i,v),r)    
  (14)   Cross Trade Effect = M(i,v),r . ∑s≠r [N(i,v),(r,s)(∆T(i,v),s / T(i,v),s)] 
 
A few limitations of the GSIM model are noted. First, a partial equilibrium model, GSIM fails to capture inter-
sectoral linkages and therefore, may suppress some significant economic interactions. Consequently, 
gains/losses from policy reforms tend to be overestimated, as resource re-allocation among sectors is not taken 
into account. Second, like most applied global models, GSIM is based on the representative agent assumption. 
However, in a region where diversity exists among different producer and consumer groups, in terms of 
responsiveness to changes in income or prices, representative welfare effects may differ non-trivially from 
                                                 
3 Approximate values, since import demand is defined as a log-linear function, not a linear function as such.  
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individual household effects. Estimated welfare responses are also based on the assumption that price 
transmissions are complete, and to the extent that changes in border parity prices are only partially transmitted 
to the household and producer levels, actual responses to reforms may be less severe. Despite these limitations, 
the GSIM model is chosen as the main method of analysis in this study because it enables decomposition and 
quantification of welfare effects into monetary terms for different household groups – the study’s main 
objective, whereas general equilibrium models tend to give aggregate welfare effects. The results from the 
GSIM model are later validated through several sensitivity analyses, one of them a general equilibrium 
assessment of the policy changes4, as discussed a greater detail in Section 5.  
 
3.2  Data Requirements  
The data required for this analysis include (1) bilateral trade volumes by source and destination, (2) domestic 
production and absorption, (3) tariff rates, and (4) elasticities of composite demand, supply and substitution. 
Data were obtained from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, SADC Secretariat, GTAP 
Database, US International Trade Commission (USITC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) database 
FAOSTAT, the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS), the WTO’s internal documents and national 
statistics offices: Central Statistics Offices (CSO) of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, National Statistical 
Office (NSO) of Malawi, and South Africa’s Grain Information Service (SAGIS) and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI). Table 2 presents a detailed outline of the data sources.  
 
Comprehensive bilateral trade data were available from WITS for 11 of the 13 SADC countries included in the 
study for a period of 4 years from 1999 to 2002. Statistics for Angola and DRC were deduced from inverse 
sides of these statistics, and from the aggregate trade statistics available in FAOSTAT. These two countries 
generally have very limited data records for their cereals sectors, and though sizeable recipients of imports from 
SADC (about 6%), are not major supplier on the regional market (collectively accounting for 0.07 % of total 
                                                 
4 The cereals sector is a fairly small contributor to GDP for most of SADC, contributing between 4 and 17% of GDP, and may be 
reasonably expected to have limited backward and forward linkage effects. 
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value of regional trade). As a result these two countries, together with Mauritius, are aggregated into a regional 
category called ‘other SADC’ countries (Mauritius is included into this category more due to its very limited 
interaction with the SADC region in the trade of cereals, rather than for data reasons). The sector ‘cereals’ is 
defined as all grains and processed products of maize, wheat, rice, sorghum, millet, and other small grains5 as 
they appear in Chapters 10 and 11 of the 2002 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. 
Table 2: Data and Sources 
 Bilateral Trade 
Volume   
Domestic 
Production and 
Absorption  
Tariff Rates  Elasticities of export 
supply, composite 
demand and 
substitution 
Angola  WTO (imports)  FAOSTAT TRAINS, SADC    - , USITC 
Botswana  WITS, CSO  FAOSTAT, CSO WITS, SADC  WITS, GTAP, USITC    
DRC WTO (imports) FAOSTAT TRAINS, SADC    - , USITC 
Lesotho WITS  FAOSTAT WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Malawi WITS, NSO FAOSTAT, NSO  WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Mauritius WITS  FAOSTAT  WITS, SADC   WITS, USITC   
Mozambique WITS  FAOSTAT  WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Namibia WITS  FAOSTAT  WITS, SADC   WITS, USITC   
South Africa  WITS, DTI  FAOSTAT, SAGIS WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Swaziland  WITS  FAOSTAT  WITS, SADC   WITS, USITC   
Tanzania  WITS  FAOSTAT  WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Zambia WITS, CSO  FAOSTAT, CSO  WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
Zimbabwe  WITS, CSO FAOSTAT, CSO WITS, SADC   WITS, GTAP, USITC  
 
The following computations were performed to obtain the comprehensive dataset used for analysis:  
• Using WITS elasticities of demand and import volumes at tariff line level, sector elasticities of demand 
were computed by the import weighted average method:  
Em = ∑i (θi.Ei), where Ei is the tariff-line specific elasticity of demand for product i, and θi is the 
proportion of imports accounted for by product i. Em is the elasticity of ‘composite demand’, and ranges 
from -0.55 to -1.01 for the countries in the region.  
• Specific duties (applied to some products entering SACU markets e.g. R0.19/kg for HS 100190 – wheat 
and meslin) are converted to their ad valorem equivalents (AVE) using the WTO formula:  
AVE = [(Specific Duty x Quantity Imported)/Value of Imports at world prices] x 100   
 Currency units are first converted accordingly to their US$ equivalents.   
                                                 
5 Includes rye, barley, oats, buckwheat, and canary seed. These collectively account for only 0.12% total value of trade.  
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• Three different sources were referred to for data on tariff rates, and in most cases the tariff rates 
recorded in each source differed, so that the SADC most favored nation rates > WITS rates > GTAP 
rates. Tariff rates were consolidated using the simple average method, and sensitivity analyses with rates 
from each source performed as detailed in section 5. 
• Tariff rates were aggregated across tariff lines using the global unit value weighted sum method to avoid 
the problem of endogeneity associated with import weighted averages, and the upward bias associated 
with taking simple averages. The global unit value is defined as global value of trade at tariff line level ÷ 
total quantities traded. Generally three different aggregation procedures can be used: import weighted 
sum, global unit value weighted sum, and the simple average (Laird, 1997). The major limitation of the 
import weighted average is that it tends to be biased downward since higher tariff rates are naturally 
associated with lower trade volumes; whereas the simple average estimates tend to overstate the level 
protection where higher tariff rates are applied on products that would not be traded in large volumes 
anyway.  
• To compute the tariffs faced by SADC countries when they export to the rest of the world, an export 
weighted average was used, by consulting the export destinations’ tariff schedules.  
• For specific tariff lines in some countries of the region, protection comes in the form of tariff rates 
quotas (TRQs), for example the tariff of 20% plus 29.4c per kilogram of exports above the quota level of 
108 279 tons for SACU imports of wheat and meslin flour (HS 110100). By making the assumption that 
imports from SADC always fall within the quota limits, the analysis of the effects of tariff reforms on 
these product lines simplifies to an analysis of the effects of reforming the in-quota tariff rates. This 
assumption makes sense because the SADC region in total does not currently export enough to SACU to 
cover the relevant quota levels. 
• Domestic absorption is defined as the proportion of domestic output that is consumed locally, computed 
as:  
Absorption = Production Value at World Prices – (Exports Value – Re-exports Value) 
 26
• The analysis employed a symmetric supply elasticity of 0.8 adopted from Jayne et al 1994 and 1995, and 
an elasticity of substitution of -5 adopted from the USITC 2004. Considering the usual sensitivity of 
results to choice of parameters such as elasticities, robustness test were performed in Section 5, using 
varying elasticities of substitution and supply6. From these analyses, lower and upper bounds of 
expected welfare changes can be determined.  
  
3.3  Simulations  
The following simulations were performed:  
1. Complete intra-regional tariff reforms, with the assumption that the SADC tariffs applied to imports 
from the rest of the world (ROW), and the level of tariff protection in the ROW, are maintained at 
current rates. This simulation assesses the potential impacts of tariff reforms in the cereals sector 
according to the SADC Trade protocol. 
2. Complete tariff reforms on imports from the region and from the world i.e. setting the most favored 
nation (MFN) tariff rate at zero (to compare welfare effects of intra-regional to global tariff reforms). 
3. Complete intra-regional tariff reforms, in only some of the regional countries, with current protection 
levels on imports from the ROW.  The goal is to evaluate the effects of defecting in some countries of 
the SADC region, to assess incentives for free-riding. 
To shed more light into the potential impacts on food security, specifically, exposure to external supply shock, 
the following simulations will also be performed:  
4.  Response to a supply shock in a single country (one of the SADC countries) first in the absence of 
liberalization, then with liberalization. 
5. Response to a supply shock from the rest of the world first in the absence of regional liberalization, then 
with liberalization.  
 
                                                 
6 Estimates for elasticities form the literature differ significantly depending on product aggregation and geographic restrictions 
(Gibson 2003, McDonald et al 1999, Weber et al 1988, ) 
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4.  Results  
4.1  Simulations 1 and 2: Elimination of intra-regional and MFN tariffs 
Results from the first 2 simulations are presented in table 3, with the parenthesized values representing results 
from the second simulation – indiscriminate elimination of tariffs on imports into SADC. The column ‘net 
private welfare effects’ represents the expected sum of producer and consumer surplus changes intended to 
measure if the economic gains from a price change more than compensate for the expected losses at household 
level. This analysis evaluates the belief that increased intra-regional trade, through facilitating better grain 
movement, will benefit both importers and exporters of food, at least on a household/farm level.  As noted in 
section 1.3, proponents of freer trade in the region normally do not place much value on tariff revenues 
generated from protectionist policies. Results indicate that indeed, the tariff revenues generated from the cereals 
sector account for a small proportion of tariff revenues – generally less than 0.5%. From the hypotheses 
presented in Section 1.2, if trade creation occurs, we expect trade with the SADC region to increase without 
reducing trade with the ROW. Trade diversion occurs when an increase in trade with SADC is achieved at the 
expense of trade with the world.  
Table 3a: Intra-regional vs MFN Tariff Elimination, Price and Trade Effects  
  Overall 
Consumer 
Price  
 
% ∆ 
Producer 
Price for 
Home 
Goods  
% ∆ 
Output  
 
% ∆  
 
Domestic 
Absorption  
% ∆ 
Imports 
from 
SADC 
$ value  
% ∆ 
Imports 
from ROW  
$ value  
% ∆ 
 
Exports to 
SADC  
$ value  
% ∆  
Exports to 
ROW  $ 
value  
% ∆ 
Aggregate 
Supply  
 
% ∆  
 
Botswana  
-2.14 
(-3.95) 
-0.53 
(-1.94) 
-0.42 
(-1.6) 
-6.1 
(-6.5) 
3.2 
(1.4) 
-8.7 
(24.6) 
20.3 
(14.6) 
5.2 
(19.9) 
1.9 
(3.6) 
Lesotho 
0.16 
(-1.08) 
0.15 
(-0.85) 
0.12 
(-0.7) 
-0.1 
(-0.4) 
-0.3 
(-0.3) 
1.4 
(36.2) 
1.13 
(-3.5) 
-2.6 
(9.0) 
-0.1 
(0.8) 
Malawi 
-1.00 
(-1.77) 
-0.69 
(-1.25) 
-0.56 
(-1.0) 
-0.6 
(-1.0) 
20.3 
(23.4) 
-4.1 
(20.7) 
20.7 
(8.3) 
7.2 
(13.0) 
0.9 
(1.6) 
Mozambique 
0.24 
(-1.94) 
0.35 
(-1.19) 
0.28 
(-1.0) 
-0.7 
(-2.2) 
17.5 
(14.6) 
0.3 
(15.4) 
24.2 
(25.8) 
-2.2 
(12.4) 
-0.2 
(1.5) 
Namibia 
0.53 
(-3.36) 
1.00 
(-2.04) 
0.80 
(-1.6) 
-2.8 
(-3.7) 
0.5 
(-10.4) 
2.5 
(26.2) 
39.1 
(16.7) 
-10.4 
(20.9) 
-0.5 
(2.9) 
South Africa 
0.50 
(-1.78) 
0.57 
(-0.92) 
0.46 
(-0.7) 
-0.9 
(-2.5) 
7.1 
(2.6) 
2.0 
(33.7) 
16.5 
(12.6) 
-5.8 
(9.8) 
-0.5 
(1.8) 
Swaziland  
0.39 
(-1.01) 
0.35 
(-0.74) 
0.28 
(-0.6) 
-0.1 
(-0.5) 
-0.1 
(-0.1) 
1.9 
(36.6) 
2.6 
(-1.9) 
-3.8 
(8.0) 
-0.3 
(0.8) 
Tanzania  
-0.11 
(-7.09) 
-0.02 
(-4.93) 
-0.01 
(-3.9) 
-0.4 
(-4.9) 
98.8 
(72.8) 
-0.4 
(70.1) 
31.1 
(37.5) 
0.2 
(49.8) 
0.1 
(5.9) 
Zambia 
-1.72 
(-2.76) 
-1.27 
(-2.05) 
-1.01 
(-1.6) 
-1.3 
(-2.0) 
20.0 
(21.0) 
-7.6 
(24.4) 
19.7 
(13.4) 
12.7 
(21.0) 
0.9 
(1.5) 
Zimbabwe 
-1.58 
(-3.30) 
-0.96 
(-2.28) 
-0.77 
(-1.8) 
-2.2 
(-3.3) 
57.2 
(53.6) 
-7.0 
(53.9) 
23.1 
(20.0) 
9.6 
(23.3) 
0.9 
(1.9) 
other SADC 
-0.42 
(-8.59) 
-0.28 
(-5.79) 
-0.23 
(-4.6) 
-0.3 
(-5.5) 
42.4 
(-4.9) 
-1.7 
(19.0) 
32.6 
(42.6) 
2.8 
(58.5) 
0.4 
(7.7) 
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Table 3b: Intra-regional vs MFN Tariff Elimination, Welfare Effects  
  Producer 
Surplus  
Change  
US$’000 
Consumer 
Surplus 
 Change 
US$’000 
Tariff Revenue  
Change  
US$’000 
Net Welfare 
Effect  
US$’000 
Net private 
welfare effects  
US$’000 
Net Welfare as 
% of total value 
of cereals trade  
Tariff 
Revenues ∆ as 
% of total 
government 
revenues 
Botswana  
-85 
(-311) 
1884 
(3503) 
-1901 
(-2296) 
-102 
(895) 
1799 
(3192) 
-0.12 
(1.06) 
-0.085 
(-0.10) 
Lesotho 
87 
(-490) 
-142 
(968) 
-125 
(-186) 
-181 
(291) 
-55 
(478) 
-0.20 
(0.33) 
-0.013 
(-0.02) 
Malawi 
-3640 
(-6528) 
5858 
(10396) 
-2321 
(-3093) 
-103 
(774) 
2218 
(3868) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.67 
(-0.89) 
Mozambique 
1088 
(-3731) 
-923 
(7436) 
-201 
(-3703) 
-37 
(0.9) 
165 
(3705) 
-0.01 
(0.0002) 
-0.04 
(-0.67) 
Namibia 
242 
(-488) 
-275 
(1756) 
97 
(-1141) 
-33 
(126) 
-33 
(1268) 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
0.005 
(-0.05) 
South Africa 
15807 
(-25270) 
-13823 
(49778) 
380 
(-26917) 
2364 
(-2410) 
1984 
(24508) 
0.09 
(-0.09) 
0.0007 
(-0.05) 
Swaziland  
66 
(-140) 
-183 
(476) 
-38 
(-71) 
-155 
(263) 
-117 
(336) 
-0.33 
(0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.002) 
Tanzania  
-123 
(-36584) 
929 
(63315) 
-926 
(-24914) 
-120 
(1816) 
806 
(26731) 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(-1.58) 
Zambia 
-4200 
(-6785) 
6555 
(10563) 
-2497 
(-3173) 
-142 
(604) 
2355 
(3778) 
-0.04 
(0.16) 
-0.57 
(-0.73) 
Zimbabwe 
-7232 
(-17068) 
12468 
(26119) 
-3992 
(-9255) 
-756 
(-205) 
5236 
(9051) 
-0.10 
(-0.03) 
   -0.59 
-(1.36)   
other SADC 
-1024 
(-20517) 
3555 
(74768) 
-3494 
(-51281) 
-963 
(2969) 
2531 
(54251) 
-0.12 
(0.37) 
          - 
Effects of Intra-regional and (MFN) tariff elimination. 
 
Overall, results from the first simulation indicate that on net, elimination of intra-regional tariffs is welfare 
reducing for the region (a robust result, as indicated by the sensitivity tests performed in section 5). Net private 
welfare gains are however positive as expected for most of the region (with the exception of Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Namibia), an indication that at the household and farm levels, the expected gains from intra-regional tariff 
reform exceed the expected losses. Unilateral elimination of MFN tariffs on all imports, on the other hand, is 
welfare improving. In fact, positive net welfare gains are also expected if only external tariffs are eliminated, 
maintaining current tariffs on imports from the region. We note here two important issue: first that the tariff 
revenues derived from the cereals sectors contribute meagerly (less than 1%) to overall government revenues 
for each of the countries in the region, and that the net welfare losses observed are very small relative to the 
total value of trade (generally less than 0.5% in the first simulation) and to the GDPs (the cereals sector 
contributing between 4 and 17% of GDP). At a sub-regional and country-level, results follow an interesting 
pattern, discussed in the following sections under a categorization of the SADC countries into (1) COMESA 
countries, (2) SACU countries, and (3) Mozambique and Tanzania.  
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COMESA Countries:  
COMESA countries (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe) are expected to experience a decrease in producer prices, as 
broader SADC tariff reforms encourage greater import response, and aggregate supply (output + imports – 
exports) increases in each market. Domestic absorption and imports from each other generally drops (a result of 
preference erosion) as trade with other countries in the SADC region increases. Imports from the ROW also 
decrease substantially for each of these countries, whereas exports to the ROW are expected to increase7. The 
lower consumer prices imply gains in consumer surplus that outweigh the losses in producer surplus in all four 
countries, an expected result for net importers from the region. Zimbabwe is a net exporter to the SADC region, 
but since the expected drop in producer prices is almost twice the expected drop in consumer prices, we also get 
an increase in (producer + consumer) surplus, indicating net private gains. The group classified as ‘other SADC 
countries’ follows comparable trends, though at a smaller magnitude of price changes. Botswana also follows 
similar trends, differing from other SACU countries, mainly because of relatively high trade with non-SACU 
SADC countries, and lower prices in these markets lead to more imports (Zimbabwe, for example, supplies 
30% of Botswana’s cereals needs). Botswana’s imports from Zimbabwe are expected to increase by up to 35% 
(higher imports from Tanzania and Zambia are also expected) as trade with SACU countries decreases (a drop 
of up to 13%, for example, is expected in the trade between Botswana and South Africa).  
  
SACU Countries:  
For the rest of SACU, prices are expected to increase, as the increase in exports from the SACU region 
(specifically South Africa) to the rest of SADC, outweighs the expected rise in both domestic output and 
imports from the region, so that aggregate supply is expected to fall. For Swaziland, Namibia and Lesotho, net 
importers from South Africa, SADC-wide tariff reforms lead to a loss of preference as South Africa’s export 
destinations, and the expected lower consumer prices from SADC tariff elimination are not realized. Instead, the 
drop in imports from South Africa, among other responses, leads to a fall in aggregate supply of cereals in these 
countries. As expected for net-importer countries, the losses in consumer surplus outweigh the expected gains in 
                                                 
7 An unusual result, considering that the level of protection in the ROW remains unchanged.  
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producer surplus from higher domestic prices, and both net welfare and net private welfare gains are negative.  
For South Africa, a net-exporter, the increase in producer surplus exceeds the loss in consumer surplus and the 
change in net private welfare is positive.  
 
South Africa is the only SADC country experiencing positive net welfare gains from increased intra-regional 
trade, mainly because for this country – a meager8 importer from the SADC region – removal of SADC tariffs 
comes at very small revenue costs. In fact, tariff revenues are expected to increase, as ROW exports to South 
Africa increase in response to the higher domestic prices. Considering that South Africa, like the other coastal 
countries of the region, imports almost exclusively from the ROW, the tariff revenue effects of this increase 
more than compensate for the expected revenue losses on trade with the region. It seems that the expected trade 
diversion from a reform of SADC tariffs (South Africa replacing its ROW imports with SADC imports) is very 
minimal in this case, possibly because South Africa imports from the world market at fairly low shipping costs, 
so that the price decreases within the region would have to be substantial for significant trade diversion to 
occur. Exports from South Africa to the ROW however are expected to drop, as the tariff level in the SADC 
region decreases. Other SACU countries, with the exception of Botswana, also record increasing imports from 
(and lower exports to) the ROW, although for these countries, trade with South Africa seems to remain 
dominant.  
 
Notably, on a sub-FTA level, the general price trends differ between countries in the SACU free trade region 
and those in COMESA. In the SACU case when preferential access is extended to the greater SADC region, it 
is still profitable for SACU countries to continue importing from South Africa, whereas for COMESA, SADC-
wide tariff reforms reveal more profitable import sources and countries switch. As a result SACU importers do 
not benefit from improved access to other SADC markets, as they already imported (and continue to import) at 
zero tariffs from South Africa. On the other hand, COMESA consumers benefit from greater market access.  
 
                                                 
8 SADC contributes less than 3% of South Africa’s imports of cereals, in value terms. 
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Mozambique and Tanzania:  
For Mozambique, smaller price and welfare effects are expected from intra-SADC tariff reforms, not surprising 
given the already low tariff rates (average about 5% for the sector). Mozambique also imports only 4% of 
domestic needs from SADC, and over 20% from the rest of the world (specifically, Asia and the United States), 
and exports a similar proportion of local production (mainly to Malawi). Thus, SADC-wide elimination of 
tariffs, though increasing Mozambique’s trade with the region, does not generate major responses on the 
domestic market. Tanzania is only different in that its tariff rates are the highest in the region (average about 
25% for the sector). However, Tanzania also trades more with the ROW than with the SADC region (regional 
imports account for only 0.5% of local needs), and has high domestic absorption rates. Therefore SADC tariff 
elimination, though triggering up to a 100% increase in trade with the region, also generates small responses on 
the domestic market. Both Tanzanian and Mozambican exports to the ROW currently face very low tariff rates, 
with sector weighted averages of less than 0.1%, so that intra-region tariff reforms provide little incentive to 
increase exports to the region. For coastal countries, trading with the world by sea may be cheaper than trading 
with the SADC region by rail or road. Indeed trade with the rest of the world remains almost unchanged after 
intra-SADC tariff elimination. We note again that net private net welfare gains are also positive for these two 
countries.  
 
The welfare effects from unilateral MFN tariff reforms indicate that the region stands to gain much more on the 
consumption side, than would be expected from intra-region tariff reform alone. Significant increases in cereal 
imports into the region are expected, triggering price drops of up to 6%. Increases in quantities demanded of 
about the same magnitude are expected, although regional output is expected to drop by almost 5%. The 
regions’ exports to the world also increase, though aggregate supply is expected in to increase universally.  
Results also indicate that the gains in consumer welfare are much higher than the losses in producer surplus, so 
that the net welfare gains are much higher than would be expected with intra-regional tariff reforms alone. 
These results seem to support the notion that exclusionary regional trade agreements run the risk of diverting 
trade away from more efficient producers, towards less efficient, preferred producers. In the case of SADC, it 
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seems South Africa benefits from being both the largest producer in the region (produces approximately 50% of 
regional output) and a convenient market for ROW exports due to location and relatively low protection rates 
(import-weighted tariff rates in the cereal world market is about 14%). When only SADC trade is freed, both 
South Africa’s exports to SADC, and its imports from the ROW9, increase. When the region opens to the global 
markets, this competitive edge is lost. The negative net welfare effects expected for South Africa under this 
policy scenario are of the nature discussed above for the rest of SADC under intra-regional tariff reforms: 
positive net ‘private’ welfare gains, nullified by larger losses in tariff revenues.   
 
The second policy option, however, could have negative income, hence food security implications, for net 
sellers of cereals in the region. Depending on country-specific profiles of the rural population, the food security 
status of the country on aggregate may worsen. The proportion of production retained for home consumption 
relative to cash sales, as well as the relative differences between the selling and buying prices, would determine 
whether producers will experience welfare improvement or losses from these expected price changes. Producers 
who are net buyers may in fact benefit from lower prices, if they gain more from lower consumer prices than 
they lose in income from lower producer prices. On the other hand, the price effects on strict buyers of grain, 
who make up around 30% of SADC’s population, are unambiguous: lower prices necessarily translate to higher 
welfare.   
 
4.2  Simulation 3: Partial Tariff Reforms 
Let us assume a hypothetical situation in which only some of the countries in the SADC region do not fully 
liberalize their cereals sectors. In this simulation, the assumption that COMESA countries, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Malawi, (with historically highly regulated cereals sectors) fail to fully liberalize. For simplicity, we make 
the assumption that these three countries do not participate in any form of tariff reforms, while the rest of the 
region implements complete intra-regional tariff reforms. Results from this simulation are presented in Table 4.  
                                                 
9 In response to higher internal prices in the South African market. Notice that South Africa’s tariff revenues increase as well.  
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Table 4a: Partial Tariff Reforms, Price and Trade Effects  
  Overall 
Consumer 
Price  
% Change 
Producer 
Price for 
Home 
Goods  
% Change 
Output  
 
% Change 
Domestic 
Absorption  
% Change  
Exports to 
SADC  
 
% Change 
  
Imports 
from SADC  
% Change  
 
Total Supply 
% Change  
 
Botswana  -2.05 -0.91 -0.7 -3.8 9.8 3.3 1.87 
Lesotho 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.3 0.09 -0.01 
Malawi 0.05 0.06 0 -0.1 24.2 -0.03 -0.05 
Mozambique -0.25 -0.17 -0.1 -0.2 1.2 16.9 0.19 
Namibia 0.41 0.92 0.7 -2.9 39.4 1.5 -0.35 
South Africa 0.11 0.13 0.1 -0.2 3.9 5.9 -0.11 
Swaziland 0.08 0.12 0.1 -0.3 2.1 0.1 -0.06 
Tanzania -0.20 -0.12 -0.1 -0.2 9.0 98.9 0.17 
Zambia 0.11 0.10 0.1 0 17.6 -0.4 -0.06 
Zimbabwe  0.57 0.61 0.5 -0.6 19.4 2.1 -0.32 
other SADC -0.43 -0.29 -0.2 -0.3 13.5 43.1 0.40 
 
Table 4b: Partial Tariff Reforms, Welfare Effects  
  Consumer Surplus 
Change 
US$’000 
Producer Surplus 
Change  
US$’000 
Tariff Revenue 
Change  
US$’000 
Net Welfare Effect  
 
US$’000 
Net Private 
Welfare Effect  
US$’000 
Botswana  1804.3 -147.4 -1894.5 -237.6 1657 
Lesotho -18.1 12.8 -43.5 -48.7 -5.3 
Malawi -317.5 291.7 7.4 -18.4 -25.8 
Mozambique 941.3 -525.9 -492.1 -76.7 415.4 
Namibia -212.5 222.3 -10.0 19.8 9.8 
South Africa -2999.2 3573.4 -35.7 538.4 574.2 
Swaziland -37.2 22.1 -21.6 -36.6 -15.1 
Tanzania 1741.0 -941.1 -1019.0 -219.1 799.9 
Zambia -428.9 340.0 5.5 -83.4 -88.9 
Zimbabwe  -4441.9 4658.9 206.2 423.2 217 
other SADC 3648.8 -1058.3 -35144.5 -924.1 2590.5 
 
 
In all three COMESA countries, both producer and composite consumer prices would increase as a result of 
tariff reforms in the rest of the region. Producer prices increase because as the rest of SADC opens up, new 
markets are opened for COMESA exports, while imports into COMESA countries from SADC and from each 
other do not change much. Aggregate supply (output + imports – exports) in these countries is expected to drop. 
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For the net-importer COMESA countries, Zambia and Malawi, the loss in consumer surplus due to higher 
consumer prices is much higher than the benefits to producers, so that these countries still experience net 
welfare losses even if they do not participate in the regional tariff reforms. The welfare losses are however 
much lower than expected when these countries participate in the FTA. For Zimbabwe, a net exporter to the 
region, the gains in producer surplus exceed the losses in consumer surplus, and positive net welfare effects are 
expected. The net private welfare gains are much smaller for all three countries. For the rest of the SADC 
region, the price effects are less than expected with region-wide reforms, while maintaining the same general 
trends. Both the net welfare effects and the private net welfare effects do not seem to follow any  particular 
trends, with the only notable change being that the SACU countries expected to lose most from broader SADC 
reforms earlier are now in a better welfare state. Therefore the implications of failure to participate in the tariff 
reform process by some countries seems to be lower private net welfare gains for the defecting nations, whereas 
the region as a whole experiences smaller but not necessarily worse welfare responses.  
 
4.3 Simulation 4:  Intra-SADC Supply shock  
In this simulation, the effect of a supply shock originating from one SADC country – South Africa – is 
evaluated. South Africa is chosen because it is the only country in the region that trades bilaterally with all of 
SADC. The effects of incremental hypothetical drops in South Africa’s output are evaluated and results from a 
20% decrease in output presented here (inter-seasonal output variability in South Africa has ranged from -45% 
to 67% around the mean in the past 25 years). Ordinarily, given the similarity in climatic conditions for distinct 
subsets10 within the region, climate related supply shocks will likely affect more than one country in the region. 
For the sake of maintaining tractability of this analysis, we assume that the supply shock is only experienced in 
one country. Two simulations were run: first evaluating the effects of the supply shock in the absence of tariff 
reforms, then after the implementation of region-wide tariff reforms.  
 
 
                                                 
10 For example South Africa, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland  
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Table 5: 20% Production Shock in South Africa   
  Composite 
Market Price  
(% change) 
Regional 
Imports   
(% change) 
Regional 
Exports   
(% change)  
Domestic 
Absorption  
(% change) 
Total Supply  
(% change) 
Overall 
Welfare 
Effects  
($’000 ) 
Botswana 
4.97 
(4.56) 
-10.35 
(-9.15) 
2.88 
(2.70) 
7.08 
(6.79) 
-7.43 
(-6.70) 
-3 310.5 
(-3 283.8) 
Lesotho 
5.60 
(5.50) 
-13.56 
(-13.40) 
0.76 
(0.75) 
5.22 
(5.12) 
-4.70 
(-4.48) 
-2 520.3 
(-2 469.3) 
Malawi 
1.43 
(1.56) 
-12.97 
(-12.32) 
0.01 
(-0.09) 
1.38 
(1.52) 
0.33 
(0.32) 
-1 903.7 
(-1 828.8) 
Mozambique 
0.52 
(0.58) 
-31.51 
(-30.74) 
4.21 
(4.56) 
0.37 
(0.38) 
-0.27 
(-0.34) 
-811.6 
(-755.9) 
Namibia 
3.14 
(3.05) 
-24.6 
(-24.32) 
2.80 
(2.64) 
3.83 
(3.98) 
-2.33 
(-2.23) 
-1 025.9 
(-998.9) 
South Africa 
6.60 
(6.48) 
9.97 
(10.24) 
-24.4 
(-24.93) 
-11.50 
(-11.39) 
-6.56 
(-6.39) 
11 837.3 
(14 414.1) 
Swaziland  
6.28 
(6.17) 
-11.38 
(-11.25) 
0.75 
(0.51) 
6.90 
(6.82) 
-5.26 
(-5.14) 
-2 210.4 
(-2 170.3) 
Tanzania 
0.09 
(0.13) 
-28.16 
(-27.36) 
4.90 
(4.97) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(-0.13) 
-425.3 
(-317.8) 
Zambia 
1.51 
(1.76) 
-22.98 
(-23.78) 
4.52 
(2.91) 
1.60 
(1.88) 
-1.95 
(-2.41) 
-2 854.5 
(-2 688.4) 
Zimbabwe 
1.22 
(1.56) 
-28.30 
(-27.36) 
9.25 
(8.20) 
0.90 
(1.25) 
-1.20 
(-1.89) 
-4 036.8 
(-3 407.3) 
otherSADC 
0.29 
(0.37) 
-28.70 
(-27.84) 
7.83 
(8.34) 
0.29 
(0.36) 
-0.18 
(-0.32) 
-1 879.5 
(-1 572.9) 
*Pre and (post) tariff reform welfare effects   
 
The results presented in Table 5 indicate that a supply shock generated in South Africa is likely to cause major 
price increases throughout the region, highest for SACU countries and lowest for countries whose trade with 
South Africa is limited, such as Tanzania. Domestic absorption is also expected to increase universally 
(countries reduce exports), but aggregate supply is expected to drop in each country due to lower imports from 
the region (specifically from South Africa). The magnitude of these responses seems to not change much after 
intra-regional tariff reforms, although in this case, the price increases expected for SACU countries is lower, 
and that for the rest of the region higher, than in the restricted trade case. Tariff reforms therefore seem to serve 
the purpose of spreading risk of a supply shock, making it less intense in the country origin (in this case South 
Africa and other SACU countries) and more intense for the rest of SADC, considering though that the 
differences are small. 
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3.4 Simulation 5: Supply shock from the rest of the world 
We test here the thesis that increased openness in trade among SADC countries reduces individual countries’ 
vulnerability to external (extra-regional) supply shocks.  The effect of a hypothetical 5% supply shock 
generated on the world market is evaluated, and results are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6: 5% Production Shock in World Market    
  Composite 
Market Price  
% change 
Regional 
Imports   
% change 
Regional 
Exports   
% change  
Domestic 
Absorption  
% change 
 Total Supply  
% change 
Overall 
Welfare Effects 
$’000  
Botswana 
2.22 
(2.16) 
-0.86 
(-0.88) 
0.86 
(0.85) 
-1.29 
(-1.72) 
-2.63 
(-2.56) 
-1 608 
(-1 598) 
Lesotho 
2.06 
(2.07) 
-1.83 
(-1.83) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.06 
(-0.06) 
-1.64 
(-1.65) 
-777 
(-777) 
Malawi 
2.11 
(2.10) 
-2.87 
(-2.92) 
1.68 
(2.57) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.72 
(-0.73) 
-2 079 
(-2 094) 
Mozambique 
3.47 
(3.44) 
4.35 
(4.18) 
-5.32 
(-5.17) 
0.66 
(0.71) 
-2.65 
(-2.64) 
-4 605 
(-4 599) 
Namibia 
3.63 
(3.68) 
4.36 
(4.50) 
0.42 
(0.43) 
-0.13 
(-0.27) 
-3.07 
(-3.18) 
-1 281 
(-1 276) 
South Africa 
2.65 
(2.66) 
1.45 
(1.48) 
-0.54 
(-0.51) 
-0.11 
(-0.08) 
-2.74 
(-2.78) 
-18 772 
(-18 343) 
Swaziland  
2.08 
(2.08) 
-1.97 
(-1.98) 
2.79 
(2.81) 
-0.25 
(-0.26) 
-1.74 
(-1.75) 
-643 
(-643) 
Tanzania 
2.88 
(2.84) 
2.00 
(1.82) 
-1.13 
(-0.02) 
0.25 
(0.31) 
-2.31 
(-2.25) 
-10 942 
(11 093) 
Zambia 
1.66 
(1.69) 
-2.77 
(-2.80) 
2.16 
(2.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-1.45 
(-1.43) 
-1 582 
(-1 592) 
Zimbabwe 
1.63 
(1.68) 
-3.24 
(-3.13) 
2.35 
(2.22) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
-1.37 
(-1.39) 
-2 705 
(-2 681) 
otherSADC 
5.22 
(5.14) 
10.46 
(10.11) 
-11.0 
(-10.45) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
-4.83 
(-4.74) 
-31 390 
(-31 230) 
ROW  
6.25 
(6.25) 
15.31 
(15.36) 
-15.66 
(-15.86) 
-4.38 
(-4.38) 
-4.38 
(-4.38) 
-283 265 411 
(-283 256 463) 
*Pre and (post) tariff reform welfare effects   
   
The price effects, as expected, are higher for countries that trade significantly with countries outside of the 
region, such as Angola and DRC (under the ‘other SADC’ group of countries), Namibia, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and South Africa. Countries like Tanzania and South Africa that, in addition to trading with the world, 
are near self sufficient, are more capable of absorbing the supply shock, and the prices effects in these countries 
are lower than expected in their less self-sufficient counterparts. A country like Namibia, on the other hand, 
with only 41% local contribution to domestic requirements, suffers higher price effects. Aggregate supply in the 
whole region is expected to drop, even for countries that do not trade much with the world. What is more 
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interesting, though, is the closeness in magnitude of change between the closed and more open market scenarios 
– emphasizing the earlier conclusion that intra-SADC tariff reforms alone do not generate major effects on the 
prices and output levels of the region. The trend of whether or not increased regional integration reduces (on the 
margin) individual countries’ vulnerability to external supply shock appears inconclusive, with country 
responses depending on pre- and post-reform trade relation with the rest of the world.   
 
One of the topical issues in the trade and food security debate is the effects of subsidies in the developed world, 
which generally translate to increased supply on the world markets and/or increased dumping in developing 
country markets, mainly in the form of food aid. The SADC region has not been exempt from these global 
trends, with food aid comprising up to 20% of total imports into the region in specific years (SADC FANR 
1996-2006). An interesting assessment therefore is to evaluate the extent to which increased inflow of grain 
from the world market would affect regional prices, both in the presence of regional tariffs, and after tariff 
reforms11. The assumption that the increase in world supply to the SADC region is absorbed by countries 
according to current proportions of world imports is made, whereby each country in the region faces an equal 
proportional shift in their ROW excess supply function. In practice, increases in world supply to the region are 
likely to be targeted to specific countries, with indirect impacts on third countries. The assumption is made to 
maintain tractability of simulation results.  
 
Results indicate that effects of increased supply from the rest of the world are quite similar to what would be 
expected under region-wide MFN tariff reforms discussed in section 4.1 above: universal price drops are 
expected, coupled with increased local supply of cereals, and higher (positive) net welfare gains. Regional 
openness does not seem to exacerbate these effects in any significant manner, although this result might change 
with the relaxation of the ‘proportional dumping’ assumption. If the increase in ROW imports affects only a few 
                                                 
11 It is not clear from the national trade statistics recorded in WITS for each SADC country whether food aid is included as part of the 
imports data or not, or in which cases it is subject to the same tariff rates imposed on commercial imports. What is clearer is the fact 
that the SADC secretariat and FAOSTAT cereals balance sheet record ‘imports’ as the sum of commercial imports and aid, and that in 
most cases, goods brought in through NGOs are tariff exempt – though in most cases these exemptions are rather ad hoc and case 
specific (Mudungwe 2002).  
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net-importer countries, to the extent that (1) aggregate supply in these countries exceeds consumption needs at 
prevailing world prices, and (2) intra-SADC rules of origin are not fully enforced, then through indirect transfer 
of grain, the effects of ROW imports would be similar to those assessed above. However if aggregate supply is 
completely absorbed by the deficit nations at prevailing world prices, and/or rules of origin are properly 
enforced, the effects of increased ROW imports will be localized within recipient countries both in the case of 
restricted trade and after tariff reforms. These analyses are beyond the scope of this study. 
Table 7:  20% Proportional Increase in Supply from World Market    
  Composite 
Consumer Price  
% change 
ROW Imports   
% change 
Domestic 
Absorption  
% change 
 Total Supply  
% change 
Overall Welfare 
Effects  
$’000  
Botswana 
-1.25 
(-1.20) 
27.5 
(27.7) 
0.28 
(0.70) 
1.7 
(1.67) 
966 
(955) 
Lesotho 
-1.00 
(-1.01) 
28.5 
(28.3) 
-0.64 
(-0.64) 
0.88 
(0.90) 
439 
(443) 
Malawi 
-1.23 
(-1.21) 
27.5 
(27.6) 
-1.16 
(-1.12) 
-0.15 
(-0.14) 
1 673 
(1 654) 
Mozambique 
-2.60 
(-2.58) 
21.6 
(21.7) 
-2.79 
(-2.81) 
1.94 
(1.94) 
5 139 
(5 147) 
Namibia 
-2.89 
(-2.95) 
20.6 
(20.4) 
-2.28 
(-2.23) 
2.42 
(2.55) 
1 268 
(1 276) 
South Africa 
-1.69 
(-1.71) 
25.8 
(25.7) 
-1.74 
(-1.77) 
1.79 
(1.85) 
25 541 
(25 589) 
Swaziland  
-0.99 
(-1.00) 
28.5 
(28.4) 
-0.45 
(-0.45) 
0.85 
(0.86) 
329 
(332) 
Tanzania 
-1.96 
(-1.97) 
24.4 
(24.4) 
-1.95 
(-1.92) 
1.52 
(1.49) 
13 794 
(13 825) 
Zambia 
-0.66 
(-0.66) 
29.7 
(29.7) 
-0.69 
(-0.69) 
0.98 
(0.94) 
1 264 
(1 226) 
Zimbabwe 
-0.75 
(-0.77) 
29.2 
(29.2) 
-0.68 
(-0.67) 
0.96 
(0.93) 
2 958 
(2 871) 
otherSADC 
-4.80 
(-4.71) 
13.0 
(13.3) 
-4.88 
(-4.76) 
4.46 
(4.35) 
36 343 
(36 312) 
*Pre and (post) tariff reform welfare effects   
 
5.  Sensitivity Analyses 
5.1 Parameter Estimates 
To evaluate robustness of the results obtained from the GSIM analysis, the following sensitivity analyses were 
performed: (1) using different supply elasticities, (2) using different values for the elasticities of substitution, 
and (3) using tariff rates obtained from the different tariff-line aggregation methods described in section 3.2. 
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The main purpose of these simulations is to ensure that results are not sensitive to the choice of elasticity values 
or tariff aggregation methods. The simulation outputs from selected sensitivity tests are included in Appendix 2.  
 
Results from the sensitivity tests support the overall results discussed in section 4.1, if not with similar 
magnitudes of change, at least with the same direction of change. Lower elasticities are shown to be consistent 
with much lower production responses, tending to reduce the expected welfare gains from higher producer 
prices, as well as the expected welfare losses from lower producer prices for countries like Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Higher supply elasticities are associated with smaller producer price effects and larger output effects 
than those predicted with an export supply elasticity of 0.8. However, even at very high elasticity values of say 
100, net welfare effects are still negative for most of SADC, although the SACU countries Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland, fare better with higher regional output response. Lower elasticities of substitution are consistent 
with lower quantity and price responses, hence smaller welfare effects, maintaining the same trends observed 
with an elasticity of substitution of 5. Here again, increasing degree of substitutability by as much as twenty-
fold (increasing substitutability between imports) will neither affect the expected direction of change, nor move 
the region into the positive net welfare range. Different tariff aggregation methods produce, in specific cases, 
some non-trivial differences in sector-level tariff protection rates. In Malawi, for example, the average tariff rate 
obtained from the import weighted average aggregation method is 1%, whereas the global unit value weighted 
sum method gives a 4% rate, and the simple average method a 16% rate. These differences translate to some 
significant differences in net welfare effects. When the higher simple average tariff rates are used, for example, 
a few additional countries would now expect positive net welfare gains from tariff reforms. This result seems to 
indicate that if indeed effective protection in this highly regulated sector exceeds tariff rates used in this 
analysis, the net welfare effects computed here would be an underestimation of what we can expect with full-
fledged trade policy reforms.  
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5.2  A General Equilibrium Assessment 
Partial equilibrium models are often criticized for failing to capture the complex inter-sectoral linkages that 
often exist in an economy. This implies that resource re-allocation among sectors is not taken into account, and 
the gains/losses from policy reforms could be overestimated. This hypothesis is tested by running comparable 
policy simulations using a global computable general equilibrium model – the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) – that allows for inter-sectoral adjustments. Expected welfare effects of tariff reforms are then 
compared to those obtained using the GSIM model. In comparing these results, we note that because the GSIM 
and GTAP models are fundamentally different models structurally, as evidence from the model structure 
discussion below, and are based on different assumptions on the structure of utility functions, elasticities, and 
measures of welfare, direct comparisons of results would be erroneous. Additionally, some of the differences in 
underlying model data, for example elasticities, tariff line concordance, tariff rates, production, consumption 
and trade volumes, were extremely difficult to reconcile. Some of the irreconcilable differences encountered 
were:  
• SADC countries appearing in the database. Of the 13 SADC countries included in this study, only 7: 
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are explicitly 
included in the GTAP database. The rest are aggregated into ‘other SACU’ and ‘other SADC’ countries.  
• Sector concordance. Only two of the cereal commodities under study: wheat and rice appear in 
disaggregated form in the GTAP database. The rest are aggregated into ‘other cereals’ and all the 
processed cereals are included as part of a much broader ‘other food’ sector. The challenge in 
consolidating these data to those used in the GSIM is that tariffs come already aggregated, and it is not 
clear what the original tariff-line values were, or how the aggregation was performed. Sector level tariff 
rates for SADC countries are generally lower than those appearing in other databases, such as WITS and 
the SADC secretariat.  
• Other statistics such as production, consumption and trade data must be taken as is in the GTAP 
database and where they differ from the GSIM data, cannot be changed.  
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Regardless of these differences, some useful insights can be drawn from this analysis. An attempt was made to 
reconciles these differences to increase comparability of results, for example, the much lower tariff rates appear 
in GTAP were transformed to an equivalent of the   GSIM tariffs. Thus the purpose of this analysis is not to 
make one-for-one comparisons of predicted welfare effects, but to evaluate the robustness of the general trends 
predicted by the GSIM analysis. The GTAP model has the added advantage that it captures a feature of the 
SADC cereals sector, that a significant number of producers (between 4 and 16%, Jayne et al 2005) are also net 
buyers of cereals, through the assumption of a single regional household that is both an owner of the factors of 
production from which household income is derived, and a consumer. This assumption also allows us to 
evaluate the household welfare effects of losses in government revenues. However, whereas the GSIM model 
enables explicit decomposition and quantification into dollar values of welfare effects on different household 
groups – the main objective of this study – the GTAP model provides more aggregated welfare effects in 
percentage terms, and disaggregation of welfare effects into producer and consumer surplus is not feasible. 
 
The GTAP model is a static general equilibrium model, comprising a regional household involved in 
consumption, savings and government spending decisions, where expenditure is distributed in fixed shares 
among these household decisions. The model assumes an explicitly additive Cobb Douglas aggregate utility 
function modeled through a non-homothetic Constant Difference of Elasticities function, which simplifies to a 
CES function when the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution is made: 
(1)  ∑iєTrade B(i,r) x Urβ(i,r)γ(i,r) x [P(i,r)/E(Pr,Ur)] β(i,r) ≡ 1 
where, for a regional household r, ∑iєTrade is the sum over the set of traded goods i consumed by the private 
household, and B(i,r) represents distribution parameters, β(i,r) substitution parameters, and γ(i,r) expansion 
parameters. P(i,r) is the price of commodity i and E(.) is the minimum expenditure required to attain a pre-
specified household utility level Ur, at the private household price vector Pr. This functional form simplifies to a 
CES function when β(i,r) = β for all i, and to a Cobb Douglas function when β = 0.  
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Current government expenditures are used to proxy the welfare gained from public goods and services provided 
to private households (thus allows us to evaluate the household welfare effects of losses in government 
revenues, unlike GSIM). Savings enter the utility function directly, where optimal savings are deduced from the 
utility maximization problem. Changes in private income and utility from policy reforms is measured by the 
percentage change in private utility in a given region, which is a function of changes in private household 
incomes, the share of the specific good in total consumption, and the income elasticity of demand:  
(2)  ur = ( yr - ∑iєTrade [θ(i,r) x p(i,r)])/ ∑iєTradeθ(i,r) x η(i,r)  
where ur is the percentage change in private utility in region r, yr is the percentage change in private household 
income in region r, θ(i,r) is the share of good i in total consumption, p(i,r) is the change in the demand price of 
commodity i, and η(i,r) is the income elasticity of demand for good i – restricted to be positive and greater than 
one for superior goods with non-homothetic preferences (equals one when preferences are homothetic).  
 
Household income is defined as the sum of the value of the household’s endowments, divided in the model into 
five broad categories: land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, natural resources and capital: 
  (3) Yr =  ∑jєEndowments Qe(j,r) x Pe(j,r) 
where Y is total income, Qe(j,r) is quantity of endowment j and Pe(j,r) is its price. Change in income from policy 
reform is then defined as:  
 (4) yr =  ∑jєEndowments φe(j,r) x pe(j,r) 
where φe(j,r) is the income share of a given endowment, and pe(j,r) is change in the endowment price. Using this 
model specification, we can evaluate the percentage changes in domestic and import prices, income, demand, 
supply, consumption expenditure and per capita utility for the regional household in a given region. The welfare 
changes resulting from a price shock are summarized in dollar values using a money metric equivalent of utility 
change – the equivalent variation.  
 
In this simulation, intra-regional tariffs are eliminated on cereals imported from the SADC region, but 
maintained on cereals imported from the world. Results from intra-regional tariff reforms using the GTAP 
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model (Table 8) indicate again that the expected price and welfare effects of tariff reforms in the cereals sector 
of the SADC region are rather small. It appears that in the general equilibrium setting, expected price and 
welfare effects are even smaller than predicted by the partial equilibrium model. With a few exceptions12, the 
general trend in expected welfare responses is similar to that expected in the GSIM model, though at smaller 
magnitudes. Notably, net welfare effects are either negative or almost negligible for most of SADC, COMESA 
countries are still expected to experience drops in producer and consumer prices, producer prices are expected 
to increase in SACU countries, welfare gains are highest for South Africa, and negligible welfare effects are 
expected for Tanzania. Domestic absorption is still expected to drop universally, and the supply response to be 
small. These results thus seem to highlight similar trends and support the earlier conclusion that expected price 
and welfare effects of intra-regional tariff reforms in the cereals sector of the SADC region are small and 
generally negative13.  
Table 8: Price and Welfare Effects, GTAP model  
  Composite 
Market Price  
(% change) 
Domestic 
Supply Price  
(% change) 
Domestic 
Output  
(% change)  
Domestic 
Absorption (% 
change) 
Equivalent 
Variation  
(% change)  
Overall 
Welfare Effects 
(% change ) 
Botswana -0.02 0 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
Malawi -1.54 -0.23 -0.94 -13.74 -0.42 -0.29
Mozambique -0.38 -0.09 -0.39 -4.75 -0.25 -0.19
South Africa 0.03 0.06 0.64 -0.63 3.64 2.55
otherSACU -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.04
Tanzania -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.51 -0.08 0.00
Zambia -0.55 -0.14 -0.87 -8.37 -0.07 0.01
Zimbabwe -0.16 0.02 0.2 -5.32 0.17 0.11
otherSADC -0.57 -0.04 -0.2 20.26 -0.21 -0.10
 
6.  Discussion of Results  
6.1 Some Food Security Implications  
Food security has been defined by FAO as the condition in which ‘all people, at all time, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
                                                 
12Botswana and Mozambique: with price and welfare effects expected to be smaller and slightly higher respectively, than earlier 
predicted. 
13 We also note that because applied welfare analyses, such as the one performed here, are second best evaluations that take into 
account the policy distortions already in existence in an economy, in principle, trade liberalization may fail to improve welfare if it 
leads to resource re-allocation from one distorted sector to an even more distorted one (Francois and Reinert, 1997).  
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active and healthy life’ (FAO, 2004). Physical availability means that enough food is produced to meet current 
demand, whereas economic access entails that consumers possess enough purchasing power to afford basic food 
requirements at prevailing market prices. Although the analysis performed in this study cannot say much about 
how the safety or nutritional content of food changes, it helps illuminate the food security issue from the 
perspective of physical and economic access.  
 
Let us first consider physical access. The production and consumption trends in the SADC region for a period 
of 12years, 1990 to 2001, indicate that the SADC region is a net surplus producer of cereals for food 
consumption (excluding animal feed and seed requirements), with average regional demand  accounting for 
about 90percent of regional production. South Africa is the only net surplus producer and contributes about 
50percent of this supply (see Appendix 2). Therefore it seems that the food security issue, at regional level, is 
more an issue of access than it is an issue of availability (bearing in mind though that in practice, food security 
is a household, as opposed to a regional, concept). The point here is that the region currently produces enough 
to feed its people. What is more pertinent is whether the lowering of tariffs produces enough incentive for 
cereals to move from surplus to deficit areas. Results from this study indicate that from a regional perspective, 
freer intra-regional trade has the effect of increasing regional supply of cereals very minimally, by a proportion 
of 0.1percent (equivalent to 26,000 tons), whereas unilateral MFN tariff reforms increase supply by over 3% 
(848 000 tons). Domestic absorption is expected to drop universally as countries become more open, implying a 
universal loss in self-sufficiency. On a country level, intra-regional tariff elimination leads to an even lower 
aggregate supply reaching some of the deficit countries, notably the some of the deficit SACU countries, while 
aggregate supply in the rest of the region remains more or less the same. Unilateral MFN tariff reforms on the 
other hand, lead to universal increases in aggregate supply at country level. The implication of these results is 
that intra-SADC tariff reforms perform poorly as a means of improving physical availability of cereals to deficit 
nations, as supply of cereals in the SADC region appears fairly irresponsive to intra-regional tariff reforms, at 
least in the short run. Reform of the broader MFN tariffs performs much better as a strategy for improving 
aggregate supply of cereals to the SADC region.      
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Noting that food security is not about expanded food production per se, but rather about improving the capacity 
to generate income and to consume (through lower consumer prices, higher incomes or both), we are also 
concerned with the effects of tariff reforms on economic access to cereals in the SADC region. Theoretically, 
removing tariffs, either at regional or global level, generates two positive income effects: first reducing the cost 
of transaction for the producer, and second, reducing the final price paid by the consumer (holds true regardless 
of whether the FTA produces trade diversion or not). Overall, results from this study appear contradictory to 
this expected outcome, and the initial policy recommendation that improved intra-trade would improve food 
security for SADC countries, as the net welfare effects of intra-SADC tariff reforms are negative for all 
countries in the region except South Africa. However at close inspection, these results may not be far from 
supporting these assertions, mainly because when assessing potential benefits of openness to food security, the 
tendency is to focus mostly on household welfare – how consumers in deficit areas and producers in surplus 
areas are likely to be affected, and if positively, generally expecting an improvement in overall food security 
status. In most cases, very little attention is paid to the effects on tariff revenues, even though as this study 
shows, these revenue losses may make all the difference in terms of whether the overall welfare effects are 
positive or negative. Let us evaluate this issue more closely.  
 
Results from the analysis indicate that in the best case scenario, when only ‘private’ net welfare effects are 
considered (by disregarding government revenue losses), positive net welfare effects are expected for the SADC 
region14. From this perspective, overall economic access to food is expected to improve – albeit meagerly – at 
regional level, from freer intra-regional trade. This scenario is not unreasonable, considering that the tariff 
revenues obtained from the cereals sector are generally insignificant relative to total government revenues (less 
than 1%), and therefore are not likely to produce any significant drops in total government expenditure. In 
addition, actual revenues collected from tariffs in developing countries have been shown to be often lower than 
the levels predicted by applied models, a result of collection inefficiencies and numerous exemptions and 
rebates that are generally not well documented. Tsikata 1999 computed the collection efficiency ratios (defined 
                                                 
14 Exceptions at country level include Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland.  
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as the implicit tariff collection ratio15 expressed as a function of the statutory rate) for South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, and obtained valued of 65.2% and 53.4% respectively. Thus the real income effects of lower 
revenues are most likely lower than expected. Moreover, preferential trade agreements usually come at a high 
administrative cost to participating countries that most applied models do not account for, through increased 
number of tariff schedules, and to enforce control policies such as the rules of origin. Since higher tariff 
revenues may not necessarily translate into improved availability of food, the food security effects of these 
revenue drops may be very small. Thus, in assessing the food security effects of trade reforms, focus is often 
placed on the producer and consumer – where direct food decisions are made.  
 
However if we consent that government revenues are an equally important component of a nation’s food 
security, then overall income available to pursue physical and economic access to food would decrease with 
lower government revenues, then the food security status of the SADC region would worsen with intra-regional 
tariff reforms, improving considerably with indiscriminate reform of MFN tariff rates. It is important to note 
that even in the best case scenario, the gains to household welfare from freer regional trade are small, much 
smaller compared to the benefits expected with multilateral liberalization (about 87% less). These results seem 
to suggest that intra-regional trade can only work as a viable food security if it is used as a precursor to 
integration with the global markets.  
 
Another equally important dimension of access to food is stability of supply and prices. Results from the supply 
shock simulations indicate that when supply shortages are experienced in one country, the bulk of the price 
variability is experienced only in that country and its current major trading partners. Although the general 
impact of greater regional openness is to smooth out country level supply and price variations, lowering the 
impact in the countries directly affected by the shock, while increasing the impact for the rest of the region, 
tariff reforms alone are not enough to effectively smooth these effects out. The general responses to supply 
                                                 
15 The implicit tariff collection ratio is simply the actual duty collected as a percentage of CIF value of imports. By expressing this 
value as a proportion of the statutory rate we obtained the extent to which the collected tariff revenues deviate from the expected 
revenues.  
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shock do not change much after regional tariffs have been removed. This study does not address the issue of 
intra-seasonal continuity in supply, but shows increased grain mobility within the region as a result of tariff 
reforms. 
 
A few caveats are in order. First, food security is a household phenomenon. This study attempts to disaggregate 
welfare effects at national producer and consumer level, however, to reach even more meaningful household 
level food security conclusions, a deeper understanding of household decomposition for each country is 
required, to ascertain for example, the proportion of net sellers, net buyers and self sufficient households; as 
well as the proportion of income derived from cereals or allocated to cereal consumption. For example, consider 
rural household A in Malawi. After tariff reforms – A’s purchase price for cereals drops by almost 2%, whereas 
its sale price drops by only 1%. If A is a net seller of one or more cereal commodities, then depending on the 
extent to which sales exceed purchases as well as the extent to which consumer prices exceed producer prices, A 
could either gain or lose from the tariff reform process. If A is a net buyer of cereals, then household food 
security improves on the margin, and if A is a self-sufficient household these price changes will not affect its 
household welfare at all. Such information would shed more light on the more micro level effects of the reforms 
discussed in this paper16.  
 
In addition to determining if the increase in net welfare is beneficial to most people, we also need to understand 
the profile of the households benefiting – are these the currently food insecure? For example, although South 
Africa appears as a food surplus nation on aggregate, some population groups within South Africa continue to 
experience hunger and malnutrition from insufficient, unstable food supplies, at the household or intra-
household level. The majority of producers in the former homelands, like most smallholders in the region, are 
                                                 
16 Note that with the exception of large scale commercial producers, most producers of cereals in the SADC region are both buyers 
and sellers of cereals, especially the staple grains. Evidence from Southern Africa suggests that generally less than 50% of rural 
producers of cereals are net sellers, and that over 70% of the sales are concentrated in about 10% of these households (Weber et al 
1988). According to Jayne et al 2005 only an estimated 4 to 21% of the producers in the region are strict sellers (higher percentage in 
countries with a dual agricultural sector), and between 8 and 39% are subsistence producers. Weber et al 1988 also suggest that 
increased food prices would benefit only a minority of producers who are heavy net sellers, and that even in cases where poor farmers 
would have benefited, they normally face supply-side constraints that hinder them from taking full advantage of these price incentive. 
Consumption, on the other hand, responds more rapidly to changing prices.  
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deficit producers and are susceptible to even non-catastrophic events such as seasonal or climatic variations. On 
the hand, large scale commercial producers, who are the majority of the surplus producers in the country, are 
likely to capture the welfare benefits predicted here, although they are certainly not among the currently food 
insecure population of the nation. Similarly, if a country like Malawi, that benefits on the consumer side, has 
say very high levels of self sufficiency among the rural and urban poor, the lower consumer prices would only 
benefit the urban elite, who are not currently food insecure. Therefore is assessing the food security benefits to 
such households from the seemingly positive aggregate producer/consumer welfare gains, it is important to 
consider these inter-household differences.   
 
Although this study addresses inter-seasonal supply and price variability, the annual statistics used in this 
analysis tend to smooth out intra-seasonal price fluctuations, and mask the intra- seasonal nature of food supply. 
It is these intra-seasonal shortages and price escalations, however, that are usually the major causes of hunger in 
the region. For example, in the 2004/05 growing season, the price of maize in Mozambique’s urban markets 
increased by 60% between the month of July and January (FEWS NET 2005). Such price increases would 
ordinarily serve as the source of cross-border trade incentives. Evidence from the region however suggests that 
tariff barriers (evaluated in this study) are not the main barrier of trade during such shortage periods. Mano et al 
2003 observe that it is at these times of shortages and price hikes that non-tariff trade policy comes into effects, 
nullifying the incentives for increased regional trade. Thus given the current non-tariff policy environment in 
the region, and the annual statistics used in this analysis, tariff reforms do not seem to cause/alleviate major 
price variability in individual countries even when a supply shock is experienced.  
 
6.2   How Results Compare to the Literature   
Overall, the results from this study indicate that on net, elimination of intra-regional tariffs is welfare reducing 
for the region (a robust result, as indicated by the sensitivity tests performed in section 5), whereas unilateral 
elimination of tariffs on all imports is welfare improving. This is an interesting result because it seems to 
indicate an absence of capacity in the SADC region to respond sufficiently to price incentives (aggregate supply 
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fails to respond even with higher supply elasticities). All the more interesting is the observation that net welfare 
gains are also expected to be positive when the SADC region eliminates tariffs on imports from the world, 
maintaining current levels of protection on imports from the region. These results seem to support the notion 
that exclusionary regional trade agreements could be welfare reducing, since they risk diverting trade away 
from more efficient producers, towards less efficient, preferred producers (Hoekman and Scheiff 2002). We 
observe that when tariff reforms are intra-regional, imports from the ROW drop for most net-importer SADC 
countries, while trade with the SADC region generally increases (indicating trade diversion); whereas non-
discriminate tariff reforms generally lead to increased imports from both the region and the world.  
 
Hoekman and Schieff 2002 predict that developing countries are more likely to lose from South-South FTAs 
because such arrangements entail little or no beneficial trade creation. They argue that a high probability exists 
that one of the members may gain – usually the most advanced country with a more developed manufacturing 
sector and is thus the closest competitor with the ROW – whereas the rest of the region would lose. They also 
suggest that in order to reduce asymmetric distribution of the gains and losses of integration, member of an FTA 
must also reduce external tariffs to lessen the chances of trade diversion. The results from this study support 
these arguments: when the external tariffs are maintained at current levels, while regional tariffs are lowered or 
removed, only South Africa (producer of 50% of the regions’ cereals, most industrialized regional country, and 
close competitor with the world) emerges as a clear beneficiary. The net welfare effects for both the SADC 
region and the world are in this case negative. When protection against the world is lowered concurrently, net 
welfare gains improve dramatically for the all countries of the region, except South Africa and Zimbabwe that 
seem to lose (net ‘private’ gains are however still positive), and the SADC region on net, is better-off. When the 
region opens to the global markets South Africa’s competitive edge is lost, and the welfare effects for producers 
and consumers are reversed, with a decrease in both producer and consumer prices leading to lower producer 
surplus and higher consumer surplus.  
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Prior evidence on the potential effects of lower intra-regional trade barriers from the SADC region, though 
appearing mixed depending on scope of economic sectors under study, tends to support the results attained in 
this study.  Yeats 1998, in his assessments of the potential benefits to sub-Sahara Africa of increased regional 
integration, observes that the region ‘appears to have relatively little to trade with each other’, arguing that the 
region has a problem of non-complementarity of export advantages and import needs. Using Revealed 
Comparative Advantage estimates, he shows that countries tend to have common comparative advantages, and 
concludes that the region faces a ‘lose-lose situation concerning policies towards regional trade agreements.’ 
This study also makes the observation that intra-industry trade such as production sharing among members of 
regional integration arrangements in SSA – a critical component in the success of these arrangements – appears 
missing. The study concludes that trade reforms along an MFN basis are a ‘far more promising option for 
Africa’, arguing that if the region is to enhance its international competitiveness and capitalize on opportunities 
in foreign markets, exchange of regional preferences alone would be insufficient.  
 
Lewis et al 1999 and Lewis 2001 use a multi-regional CGE simulation model to assess the economic impact of 
alternative free trade areas between South Africa, the EU and the global market, and find that such FTA 
initiatives are beneficial for South Africa, in some cases for non-participant SADC countries as well (trade 
creation effects in all FTAs including South Africa and either the EU or the global market exceeded trade 
diversion effects). These studies also show that trilateral FTAs (for example between South Africa, the EU and 
the rest of SADC) yield higher economic gains for SADC countries than a bilateral FTA between South Africa 
and the rest of SADC. GDP increases of over 4% were predicted in the former scenario, compared to only 
0.33% in the later case (real absorption was actually predicted to decrease in the latter case). These studies thus 
conclude that South Africa is not large enough to serve as a ‘growth pole’ for the entire SADC region, arguing 
that access to EU markets provides substantially larger gains for the rest of SADC.  
 
Jachia and Teljeur 1999 also reach similar conclusions in their analysis of the welfare impacts of a South Africa 
– EU FTA. This study uses the SMART model to show that a North-South Free Trade Agreement between 
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South Africa and the EU would be welfare improving for both countries and some non-participating SADC 
countries. South Africa’s agriculture sector is in fact predicted to gain the most, from increased exports to the 
EU. These gains however are predicted to come at the cost of worsening trade balances and significant tariff 
revue losses for South Africa, and some significant trade diversion for particular countries in the SADC region. 
 
Wobst 2002’s study of the impact of domestic and global trade liberalization on five southern African countries 
used a CGE model to show that tariff cuts in these countries generate limited consumption and output 
responses. A 50% universal cut in tariffs, for example, is predicted to lead to private consumption and output 
responses in the region of less than 0.4% and 0.7% respectively. In the same study, the author shows that higher 
adjustments in the region are expected from macro-economic reforms such as exchange rate reform, than from 
tariff reforms. These expected responses are similar in magnitude to those predicted by the analyses performed 
above. In their survey of literature on agricultural supply response to prices in Africa, Weber et al 1988 also 
draw conclusions from several regions of the continent suggesting limited cereals supply responses to price 
increases. They review literature suggesting that price policy is likely to be ineffective in improving production 
and improving broad-based food security in the region.  
 
In a related study – evaluating the trade relations between Malawi and Mozambique – Arlindo and Tschirley 
2003 highlight the importance of location of producer and consumer groups in a given country in assessing the 
potential effects of greater regional openness on their income and food security status. In this study, the authors 
find that even though increased trade with Malawi causes greater export of cereals out of Mozambique, these 
come at no significant cost to urban consumers who are currently not within reach to benefits from the surplus 
output.  From this literature two main messages emerge from the southern Africa region: first that tariff reforms 
alone tend to generate limited supply and consumption responses, that may increase if implemented 
concurrently with broader macro reforms, and second that intra-regional preferential market access produces 
very limited, even negative, welfare responses for participating countries, that would increase substantially 
when the region integrates into the global economy. 
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6.3  Limitations of the Study   
The analyses performed in this study suffer a few limitations worth noting. We first reiterate the model related 
limitations, also discussed in section 4.1.  The GSIM model is based on the representative agent assumption, 
where the level of responsiveness to price changes is taken to be the same across different income groups and 
geographic locations. In a region where producer and consumer groups are diverse, in terms of both income 
elasticity of demand/supply and level of response to changes in border parity prices, consumption and 
production responses to trade reforms may also differ significantly within countries. The estimated welfare 
responses also are based on the assumption that price transmissions are complete, and to the extent that changes 
in border parity prices are only partially transmitted to the household and producer levels, may overestimate 
actual responses to reforms. Additionally, GSIM is a partial equilibrium model, thus does not take into account 
the inter-sectoral linkages that may exist between the cereals sector under study and other sectors of the 
economy. Therefore we might expect again the actual equilibrium responses to be less severe than those 
predicted in this study. Our analysis of the sector reforms using a general equilibrium model supports this 
hypothesis.   
 
In addition to these structural limitations, GSIM makes several assumptions that we might want to question 
regarding their applicability to the cereals sector of the SADC region. First is the assumption of local linearity 
of demand and supply functions. We note here that if the demand function is instead convex to the origin 
indicating diminishing marginal utility (true for the log linear form adopted in the model specification), then a 
linear approximation would lead to an overestimation of consumer surplus responses. Similarly for the supply 
function, if instead the marginal cost of production is increasing at an increasing rate (also true for the log linear 
form adopted here), we expect the estimated producer surplus responses to be an underestimation of the actual 
values. These are only marginal deviations though, since only local linearity is assumed, and both these 
functions are log-linear otherwise.  
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Second is the assumption that elasticities of export supply and substitution are constant and symmetric among 
trading partners. On the elasticity of supply, the symmetry of the elasticity among trading partners implies that 
producers in all countries are equally capable of responding price incentives. However, considering the diversity 
of climatic conditions and advancement of production sectors in different countries, it is clear that producers in 
some countries may be better positioned to respond to price incentives than others. For example, producers in a 
country like Botswana whose geographical and climatic conditions are restrictive may be incapable of 
responding to price incentive much the same way that producers in a climatically favorable environment such as 
Tanzania would. Similarly the degree of substitutability between local production and imports may not be 
uniform across imports from all countries of the region. For example, if for example the removal of tariffs 
causes major supply increases in both Tanzania and South Africa, we may expect South Africa imports to have 
a greater impact on Namibian markets than Tanzanian imports, simply due to proximity of the excess supply 
and the lower transportation costs, regardless of the trade relations among these countries. Since regional 
averages are used in this study, overall, we may expect the elasticity values employed in this study to over-
estimate the degree of supply response or product substitutability for some countries of the region, and under-
estimate these responses for others.  
 
We now focus on the estimation process and the data used. The quantitative analyses described in Section 3 
enable us to evaluate only the welfare effects resulting from tariff reforms, and capture neither the potential 
implications of concurrent trade facilitation effects – such as improved trade policy coordination and border 
efficiencies, nor the potential effects of reforming other non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers, where they exist, 
would imply higher effective rates of protection in this sector, and their removal, higher price and welfare 
effects. We note that the cereals sector of the SADC region continues to be subject to several non-tariff barriers 
to trade in the form of export-import regulations, cumbersome customs documentation and clearance 
procedures, quality and safety standards, and phyto-sanitary requirements, as discussed in detail in section 1.3. 
Therefore we expect full-fledged trade reforms to have larger welfare effects than those predicted in this study.  
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The analyses performed in this study aggregate different types of cereals produced/consumed in the SADC 
region into one sector – the cereals sector. This sector aggregation, while enabling a more comprehensive 
assessment of food security effects, also masks some important intra-sectoral surplus/deficit trends for 
individual countries in the region. Consider the case of South Africa: although this country has managed to 
produce more than its domestic requirements in maize, it produces only 45% of its wheat requirements, and 
imports most of its rice (FAOSTAT, 2005). Therefore although at sector level South Africa is a net seller, it is a 
net buyer of specific commodities on a sub sector level. The implications of aggregation are that (1) the food 
security and income effects of higher prices would differ significantly among specific commodities in the 
sector, and (2) the expected sectoral average changes in prices may differ from the actual individual commodity 
price responses.      
 
Finally, because the GSIM analysis is based on observed trade volumes, it can only capture responses 
originating from countries already experiencing positive trade with each other, but fails to capture ‘new trade’ 
that may result from tariff reforms for those countries currently not trading with each other due to restrictive 
tariff rates. The implication of this is that predicted trade responses underestimate the responses that would 
actually occur once tariff reforms are complete. To address this problem a small trade value of US$1 was 
recorded instead of a value of US$0 for countries that showed no signs of trading with other, to enable a 
positive trade response in cases where price incentives are large enough17.  
 
7. Conclusion  
As the SADC policy maker struggle with the issue of recurrent food shortages and persistent chronic food 
insecurity for the vulnerable poor populations, scholars and policy advisers turn to regional trade as a critical 
component of a comprehensive food strategy, emphasizing that: ‘Regional free trade agreements, as facilitated 
through … the SADC Protocol on Trade, can help SADC countries achieve national food security through 
                                                 
17 One might argue though that for two countries that never traded with other over the four-year period of study (1999-2002), despite 
season and policy induced price fluctuations, tariff reform induced price changes would have to be rather large to reverse this trend.  
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regional trade integration.’ Mano et al 2003. This study was a step towards bringing quantitative evidence to the 
trade-food security policy debate. Using the GSIM model, in an analysis of the food grain sectors of thirteen of 
the fourteen SADC countries, the study evaluated the welfare effects of tariff reforms in the cereals sector of the 
SADC region. The study sought to answer the following questions:  
(1) Does openness increase aggregate supply of cereals, available at lower prices to consumers? 
(2) Does openness improve regional wealth, through higher surplus for producers of grains, and/or 
increased buying power for consumer?   
(3) Does tariff reform reduce extra-regional exports and curb cross-hauling?  
(4) Does increased openness increase vulnerability of regional countries to external price/supply shock?  
Results from the analysis suggest that at the regional level, all else being constant, freer intra-regional trade has 
the effect of increasing aggregate supply of cereals very minimally, and the average price of food is expected to 
drop slightly. The removal of tariffs increases mobility of grains in the region, though in such as manner that the 
new equilibrium prices are not remarkably different from original prices for most countries. Intra-SADC trade 
increases, whereas trade with the world generally decreases, indicating diversion of trade from the rest of the 
world to the region. Cross-hauling is however expected to increase with intra-regional tariff reforms, suggesting 
that this phenomenon is possibly a result of response to cross-border surplus/deficit and price incentives among 
geographically close regions within neighboring countries, rather than countries trying to avoid high tariff 
barriers18. In case of intra-regional supply shocks, higher price and welfare responses are expected under freer 
markets for countries of the region other than the source of the shock (the country experiencing the shock is 
better able to cope), though only slightly different from what would be expected in the absence of tariff reforms. 
The question of whether or not increased regional integration reduces (on the margin) individual countries’ 
vulnerability to external supply shock appears inconclusive, with country responses depending on pre- and post-
reform trade relation with the rest of the world. Net welfare effects are small and negative, implying lower 
regional income. These results are robust to changes in elasticities of supply and substitution, in terms of 
                                                 
18 Regional tariff reforms thus enables countries in which both deficit and surplus regions exist to import and export the same 
commodity, by taking advantage of geographic proximity to deficit or surplus regions in neighboring countries.  
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expected direction of change. Engaging in indiscriminate tariff reforms on all imports is expected to produce 
larger, more positive welfare effects. Aggregate supply is also expected to increase substantially and prices to 
drop by a comparable magnitude, while trade with both the region and the world increases. Overall we can 
conclude that intra-regional tariff elimination per se, is not a sufficient policy option in inducing greater 
regional supply of cereals available at lower prices to consumers. Autonomous MNF tariff reforms seem to be a 
better policy option in attaining this objective.  
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APPENDIX 1: Some Basic Applied Trade Policy Analysis Models   
 
A Perfect-Substitutes Partial Equilibrium Model:  
The linearized perfect substitute model for the import sectors specifies the following functions: 
 Domestic demand:  D = In(qd(p)) = kd + η In(p) 
Domestic supply: S =  In(qs(p))= ks + ε In(p) 
 Import demand:  MD =  In(md(p)) = kmd + ή In(p),  
where md(p) = qd(p)- qs(p) 
 Import supply:  MS = In(ms(pw))= ms(pw) = kms + έ In(pw) - έ In(1 + t + ω) 
    where pw(1 + t + ω) = p 
where t represents a tariff tax, and ω represents non-tariff tax, the k’s are constants, pw is the world price, and η, 
ή, ε and έ are elasticities for demand, supply, import demand and import supply respectively.  Equilibrium 
prices and quantities are then obtained by solving the system of equations for the equilibrium price, and the 
associated producer and consumer surpluses can be deduced.  Welfare gains from exchange or policy change 
are measured through the evaluation of the Marshallian aggregate surplus.  Policy related welfare effects can be 
evaluated by calculating the changes in aggregate surplus resulting from specific changes in t and ω; new 
equilibrium prices, production and consumption levels can also be derived.  Linearizing the model through log 
transformations simplifies the estimation of equilibrium values, however, this kind of simplification can 
significantly bias results due to linearization error, especially for policy shifts that may cause large responses 
(Francois and Hall, 1997). 
 
The Salter-Swam Model:  
The Salter and Swan model measures aggregate social welfare either to ascertain if an economic system 
performs well in maximizing social objectives, such as internal balance, external balance and internal price 
stability, or to evaluate if in fact the social objectives can be achieved through available institutions.  The model 
defines a simplified economic system, represented in terms of aggregate volume of domestic production (Qs), 
aggregate volume of domestic demand (Qd), import surplus (J = Qd - Qs), average internal price level (P), 
average external price level (R), average money wage level (W), and average real wage level (V), where the 
following identities hold:    
(1)  Qd = Qs + J,  
(2)  Qs = f(Qd, R/W),  
(3)  J = g(Qd, R/W), and  
(4)  P = h(Qd, R, W).  
Domestic resources and terms of trade are taken as given.  Within this framework, the structure of the economy 
determines the required volumes of demand, the money and real wage levels, and the external price levels that 
would achieve pre-specified objectives.  The Salter Swan model has since been developed to handle factor 
market linkages (Jones, 1965), non-traded goods (Jones 1974), static and dynamic input-output accounts 
(Dervis, de Melo, Robinson, 1982), social accounting matrices (deMelo, Robinson, 1989) and factor markets 
and semi-traded goods (Thierfelder and Robinson, 2002).  These models have come to be known as computable 
general equilibrium models.  
 
The basic CGE model, described by Devajan et al 1997 as the 1-2-3 model for one country with two production 
sectors and three goods, is briefly discussed.  The production sectors are normally classified as the tradable and 
non-tradable goods sectors, and the goods as the exports, imports and domestic goods.  An export good is 
defined as a good produced only for the export market, and is not demanded domestically, an import good is a 
good imported but not produced locally, and a domestic good is produced and sold only locally.  The model 
allows three types of market participants: producers, households and the rest of the world; and uses data on 
external trade (imports, exports and world prices) and domestic trade (production, consumption and domestic 
prices) to estimates the welfare effects of alternative trade policies.  The model assumes: (1) imperfect 
substitution of domestic goods for imports, (2) concave production possibility frontier (X) specified as a 
constant elasticity of transformation function, (3) representative consumer, who receives all the income, and (4) 
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constant elasticity of substitution aggregate consumption function, Qs. X is composed of exports and supply of 
domestic good, and is taken as fixed, which is equivalent to assuming full employment of all primary factor 
inputs. Qs is made up of the goods consumed locally, imports and the domestic good, with constant substitution 
elasticity σ.  The social maximum is thus defined as the point at which the economy is in equilibrium, where 
marginal rate of transformation in production equals marginal rate of substitution in consumption. These 
marginal rates are equal to the foreign rate of transformation in the absence of trade distortions, and efficiency 
is achieved. 
 
The Basic Computable General Equilibrium Model:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Define the endogenous variables:     Exogenous variables: 
M = Import good       Y = Total sector income    
E = Export good       B = Exogenous balance of trade   
Dd = Demand for domestic good      pw,m = World price of imports  
Ds = Supply of domestic good      pw,e = World price of exports 
Qd = Demand for composite consumer good   t  = import tariff rate    
Qs = Supply of composite production good   τ = export tax rate      
pm = Domestic price of import good    σ = Import substitution elasticity          
pe = Domestic price of export good    Ω = Export transformation elasticity 
pd = Domestic price of domestic good    
pq = Domestic price of composite consumer good   
px = Domestic price of composite output    
R = Exchange rate      
 
The model defines the following functions: 
(1) Qs = F(M, Dd; σ)  Import aggregation function  
(2) X = G(E, DS; Ω)  Export transformation function 
(3) Qd = Y/Pq   Income demand function 
(4) M/Dd = f3(pm, pd)  Import demand equation  
(5) E/Ds = g3(pe, pd)  Export supply equation 
(6) Y = px.X + R.B  Income supply function 
(7) pq = f1(pm, pd)  Consumer price 
(8) px = g1(pe, pd)  Producer price 
(9) pm = f2(R, pw,m,t)  Import price 
(10) pe = g2(R, pw,e, τ)  Export price 
The equilibrium market clearing conditions are: 
(11) pw,m M – pw,e E = B Balance of trade constraint 
(12) Dd – Ds = 0  Domestic demand-supply equilibrium 
(13) Qd – Qs = 0  Aggregate demand-supply equilibrium 
In equilibrium the market is characterized by: 
 δQs/δDd   =    pd  =    δX/δDs  =    pd 
      δQs/δM          pm         δX/δE          pe   
 
Sources: de Melo, J., 1988. ‘Computable General Equilibrium Models for Trade Policy Analysis in Developing Countries: A 
Survey’. Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 10. 
 Devarajan, S.; Go, J.D.; Lewis, J.D.; Robinson, S.; Sinko, P. 1997. ‘Simple General Equilibrium Modeling.’  In Francois, 
J.F.; Reinert, K.A. (eds), Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge University Press.  
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  APPENDIX 2: Parameter Value Sensitivity Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Effects: Ex = 2.5 
  welfare other 
  
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net welfare 
effect 
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices 
Change in 
Output 
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good 
Market Price 
for Home 
Good 
  US$ US$ US$ US$ percent percent percent percent 
Botswana  -63771.2 1861503.9 -1895684.8 -97952.1 -2.12% -1.0% -0.40% -0.40% 
Malawi -2044485.0 4293693.9 -2312192.9 -62984.0 -0.73% -1.0% -0.39% -0.39% 
Mozambique 451867.4 -1699.1 -458438.3 -8270.0 0.00% 0.4% 0.14% 0.14% 
Namibia 170929.8 -202510.0 9073.1 -22507.1 0.39% 1.8% 0.70% 0.70% 
South Africa 10135136.2 -8778794.5 185978.6 1542320.3 0.32% 0.9% 0.37% 0.37% 
Swaziland 36139.4 -118150.2 -21233.0 -103243.8 0.25% 0.5% 0.19% 0.19% 
Tanzania -49949.1 860756.4 -918101.9 -107294.6 -0.10% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01% 
Zambia -2317000.3 4702846.0 -2481918.1 -96072.4 -1.23% -1.8% -0.70% -0.70% 
Zimbabwe -3872930.1 9336212.9 -5930205.6 -466922.9 -1.19% -1.3% -0.51% -0.51% 
Lesotho 59958.4 -140834.5 -42651.6 -123527.7 0.16% 0.3% 0.10% 0.10% 
other SADC -739091.6 3312706.5 -3437069.9 -863454.9 -0.39% -0.5% -0.20% -0.20% 
ROW  -935402.9 671444.5 -356773.4 -620731.8 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 
Summary of Effects: Es = 10 
  welfare other 
  
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net welfare 
effect 
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices 
Change in 
Output 
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good 
Market Price 
for Home 
Good 
  US$ US$ US$ US$ percent percent percent percent 
Botswana -122561.4 1926155.8 -1945055.4 -141461.0 -2.19% -0.6% -0.76% -0.76% 
Malawi -6534515.9 8804813.1 -2397968.9 -127671.7 -1.50% -1.0% -1.25% -1.25% 
Mozambique 751525.2 -319116.6 -433393.0 -984.4 0.08% 0.2% 0.24% 0.24% 
Namibia 316838.9 -406449.5 72033.2 -17577.5 0.79% 1.0% 1.30% 1.30% 
South Africa 22534427.4 -19791972.7 1564618.3 4307073.0 0.71% 0.7% 0.82% 0.82% 
Swaziland 120849.1 -323263.1 -18601.7 -221015.6 0.69% 0.5% 0.64% 0.64% 
Tanzania -497537.9 1293190.8 -1147141.6 -351488.7 -0.15% -0.1% -0.07% -0.07% 
Zambia -6666157.7 9035531.5 -2605048.0 -235674.3 -2.36% -1.6% -2.02% -2.02% 
Zimbabwe -12125206.2 17109104.3 -6464515.4 -1480617.2 -2.17% -1.3% -1.61% -1.61% 
Lesotho 290406.4 -502094.6 -36182.7 -247870.9 0.56% 0.4% 0.50% 0.50% 
other SADC -1349893.5 3841579.1 -4674300.0 -2182614.5 -0.46% -0.3% -0.37% -0.37% 
ROW  -1145065.6 585993.8 -755926.6 -1314998.3 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Summary of Effects: Global unit value average tariff aggregation method x 2 
  welfare other 
  
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net welfare 
effect 
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices 
Change in 
Output 
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good 
Market 
Price for 
Home Good 
  US$ US$ US$ US$ percent percent percent percent 
Botswana -232828.8 3767807.3 -3863937.6 -328959.1 -4.14% -1.2% -1.45% -1.45% 
Malawi -7410562.8 11973618.0 -4710021.3 -146966.1 -2.02% -1.1% -1.42% -1.42% 
Mozambique 1180789.6 -271526.1 -897772.5 11491.0 0.07% 0.3% 0.37% 0.37% 
Namibia 253720.6 -319435.3 38070.8 -27644.0 0.60% 0.8% 1.05% 1.05% 
South Africa 18991298.5 -16483718.7 951653.2 3459233.0 0.59% 0.6% 0.69% 0.69% 
Swaziland 93577.8 -240713.1 -41381.1 -188516.4 0.51% 0.4% 0.49% 0.49% 
Tanzania 488023.7 328445.1 -856797.3 -40328.6 -0.04% 0.1% 0.06% 0.06% 
Zambia -8217933.8 13025322.4 -5102824.0 -295435.3 -3.37% -2.0% -2.49% -2.49% 
Zimbabwe -4308562.2 9649301.5 -5936442.9 -595703.5 -1.23% -0.5% -0.57% -0.57% 
Lesotho 160126.2 -302024.8 -83115.5 -225014.1 0.34% 0.2% 0.27% 0.27% 
other SADC -999306.4 3504702.8 -3483104.4 -977708.0 -0.42% -0.2% -0.28% -0.28% 
ROW  92605.7 -542820.3 -561490.6 -1011705.2 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
 
Summary of Effects: Simple average tariff aggregation method 
  welfare other 
  
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net welfare 
effect 
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices 
Change in 
Output 
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good 
Market 
Price for 
Home Good 
  US$ US$ US$ US$ percent percent percent percent 
Botswana -38355.7 1961410.4 -2066296.3 -143241.6 -2.22% -0.2% -0.24% -0.24% 
Malawi -10320640.5 16776050.2 -6613424.8 -158015.1 -2.81% -1.6% -1.98% -1.98% 
Mozambique 1654178.0 -593620.9 -999934.2 60622.9 0.15% 0.4% 0.52% 0.52% 
Namibia 265759.6 -360175.8 19050.4 -75365.8 0.70% 0.9% 1.10% 1.10% 
South Africa 22040143.6 -19384739.0 495369.6 3150774.3 0.70% 0.6% 0.80% 0.80% 
Swaziland 88085.6 -296485.7 -15217.2 -223617.3 0.63% 0.4% 0.47% 0.47% 
Tanzania 670676.8 125373.5 -810001.7 -13951.5 -0.01% 0.1% 0.09% 0.09% 
Zambia -5902456.8 9250421.6 -3560105.4 -212140.6 -2.41% -1.4% -1.78% -1.78% 
Zimbabwe -9510239.3 16083669.7 -7615876.1 -1042445.6 -2.04% -1.0% -1.26% -1.26% 
Lesotho 227973.5 -452445.3 -31521.0 -255992.7 0.50% 0.3% 0.39% 0.39% 
other SADC 4460417.8 5270622.3 -10973109.8 -1242069.8 -0.62% 1.0% 1.22% 1.22% 
ROW  237232.9 -940321.6 -825113.3 -1528202.0 0.00% 0.0% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Summary of Effects: Import weighted average tariff aggregation method 
  welfare other 
  
Producer 
surplus 
Consumer 
surplus 
Tariff 
revenue 
Net welfare 
effect 
Change in 
Overall 
Consumer 
Prices 
Change in 
Output 
Producer 
Price for 
Home Good 
Market 
Price for 
Home Good 
  US$ US$ US$ US$ percent percent percent percent 
Botswana -61454.2 1419175.7 -1634850.4 -277129.0 -1.62% -0.3% -0.38% -0.38% 
Malawi 3586954.2 -5493566.6 -72237.4 -1978849.8 0.94% 0.5% 0.68% 0.68% 
Mozambique 9473014.9 -15989773.0 4252417.5 -2264340.6 4.16% 2.4% 2.97% 2.97% 
Namibia 127737.3 97033.5 -201237.2 23533.7 -0.19% 0.4% 0.53% 0.53% 
South Africa 13167956.3 -10320751.9 -571438.1 2275766.3 0.37% 0.4% 0.48% 0.48% 
Swaziland 80971.7 -197561.7 -13663.3 -130253.3 0.42% 0.3% 0.43% 0.43% 
Tanzania -300420.6 1086391.5 -910796.9 -124826.0 -0.13% 0.0% -0.04% -0.04% 
Zambia -5082320.6 7954280.6 -3159350.1 -287390.1 -2.07% -1.2% -1.53% -1.53% 
Zimbabwe -668216.9 2822973.9 -4085345.9 -1930588.9 -0.36% -0.1% -0.09% -0.09% 
Lesotho 209717.6 -448493.5 60003.3 -178772.6 0.50% 0.3% 0.36% 0.36% 
other SADC -1042271.6 3613853.1 -3493491.6 -921910.2 -0.43% -0.2% -0.29% -0.29% 
ROW  -23812498.1 23489580.7 -422453.0 -745370.4 -0.01% 0.0% -0.01% -0.01% 
 
